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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the raison d’être of corporations as it is reflected in the 
maximands of corporate governance. The debate over stockholders’ versus stakeholders’ 
interests as such maximands has been raging for decades. Advances in economic theory have 
not only failed to resolve this debate but have established that the problem is graver than what 
many may have estimated. This paper turns this debate on its head: Instead of asking What or 
Whose interests should corporations maximize, the real question is Why is this debate taking 
place at all? Aiming to extend current economic analyses of the maximands issue, this paper 
puts forward a new theory about the factors that determine these maximands. Recent 
advances in psychological research point to value emphases at the individual and societal 
levels and to the need for cognitive closure as such factors. The theory proposes the notion of 
value complexity as an organizing element that may associate certain value emphases with 
cognitive style. Overall, this theory provides explanations for various sticky points in the 
stockholder-stakeholder debate in the United States and in international settings, identifies
gaps in other theoretical accounts, and generates testable hypotheses for empirical research. 
Extant evidence supports this theory.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly a century now, lawyers and scholars in other fields have been debating the 
question Whose interests should corporate fiduciaries maximize? Michael Jensen, among the 
founding fathers of modern corporate governance theory, recently argued that “200 years’ 
worth of work in economics and finance indicates that social welfare is maximized when all 
firms in an economy maximize total firm value,” which is defined as the value of equity plus 
other financial claims.1 Others, however, call for “corporate social responsibility,” holding 
that in addition to shareholders’ interests, corporate officers must give weight to the interests 
of other corporate and societal constituencies. The latter are commonly called “stakeholders.” 
The list of such potentially eligible stakeholders includes creditors, employees, customers, 
local communities, and the environment. This stockholder-stakeholder debate has reached 
such scope that some critics remarked, not entirely without merit, that these issues have now 
been debated ad nauseam.2
This paper asks a new question that turns this debate on its head. Instead of asking 
What or Whose interests should corporations maximize I ask Why is this debate taking place 
at all? Unearthing the roots of the stockholder-stakeholder debate has become crucial not 
only in the United States but in many other countries as well. Prominent international bodies 
and numerous national ones have promulgated codes of principles for optimal corporate 
1
 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 
7 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 297, 302 (2001). Versions of this article appeared in 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2001); 12 
BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002); BREAKING THE CODE OF CHANGE 37 (Michael Beer & Nithan Nohia, eds. 2000); 
UNFOLDING STAKEHOLDER THINKING _ (Joerg Andriof et al., eds. 2002).
2
 Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and 
Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999) 
3governance. These codes invariably call for giving priority to shareholders’ interests while 
acknowledging the interests of other stakeholders.3 Yet they give no guidance as to how can 
this target be met.
This paper maintains that two hundred years were not enough for resolving the debate 
over the maximands of corporate governance.4 My goal is twofold – both constructive and 
critical. In the constructive mode, this paper advances a new theory on the maximands of 
corporate governance, that identifies crucial but heretofore neglected elements that engender 
this problem. In the critical mode, this paper advances a new reading of existing analyses of 
corporate constituencies as corporate governance maximands. 
Theoretical analyses thus far have failed to provide a satisfactory answer to the 
maximands problem. A careful reading of the seminal debate between Adolf Berle and E. 
Merrick Dodd indeed shows that several commentators may have misinterpreted this debate. 
Contrary to common wisdom, this paper shows that Berle agreed with Dodd that the interests 
of non-shareholder constituencies should be advanced by corporate fiduciaries in tandem 
with shareholders’ interest. Their disagreement revolved over whether and how this task 
could be implemented. Both scholars, however, were unable to answer these questions. As it 
happens, the legal literature has made very little progress since Berle first identified this 
implementation problem in the early 1930s.
(“For centuries legal, political, social, and economic commentators have debated corporate social responsibility 
ad nauseam.”)
3 See below Section V.B.
4
 The use of the term “maximand” in this context follows FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 35-39 (1991).
4The traditional law and economics perspective holds that in determining the 
maximands of the corporation, exclusive priority should be given to its residual claimants. 
This, in essence, is the basis for Jensen’s view, in addition to other important commentators.5
This principle appears elegant and appealing at first glance. At each point of time, one only 
needs to identify the corporate constituency that holds the residual claim on the corporation. 
This residual claim should be the maximand for corporate fiduciaries. By definition, there can 
only be a single residual claimant – shareholders in the regular course of business and 
creditors during insolvency. Q.E.D.
Well, not quite. The fundamental flaw in this back-of-the-envelope economic analysis 
lies in its reliance on the notion of residual claim. This concept is easy to grasp and 
employing it is largely consistent with central doctrines of corporate law. Yet this analysis 
hides an implicit assumption, that apart from the residual claim all other claims on the
corporation—or, more accurately, the interests of other stakeholders—are fixed and well 
defined. Hence, they are assumed away from the analysis such that only the residual claim 
remains to be maximized. This assumption is unrealistic, however. A more sensible 
analysis—reflected in modern economic theory of the firm—acknowledges that the corporate 
enterprise comprises several constituencies whose interests are both interdependent and 
indeterminate. As a result, legitimate bona fide disputes can arise with regard to the scope of 
entitlements in particular situations. As these interests may be conflicting with one another—
e.g., those of shareholders, creditors, and employees when the firm faces financial or business 
hardship—corporate decision makers are forced to consider them all simultaneously. In fact, 
these interests must be reconciled on an on-going basis if the firm is to keep functioning. 
5 See below Section III.E.1.
5The corporate governance problem therefore is not one of maximizing over a single 
factor (the maximand). Rather, it calls for optimizing over several factors simultaneously. 
200 years’ worth of work in economics and finance are of little help for this task. Ironically, 
it is not even needed. Even high-school level calculus provides that one cannot maximize an 
expression with more than a single unknown variable. In a rare treatment of this subject by 
economists, Erik Berglöf and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden opine that the economic approach 
to corporate governance should be generalized to a model of multilateral interactions among 
a number of different stakeholders. Such a model must also take into account how a country’s 
legal and political system affects this delicate balance.6 Important as it may be, these scholars 
argue, shareholder protection may not be sufficient for sustainable economic development, 
especially in transition economies.7
Economic theory currently fails to offer a framework for dealing with multiple 
stakeholders of firms that are run by agents. Recent advances in behavioral economics may 
bring some progress in this regard. But, as Berglöf and von Thadden note, in order fully to 
generalize the economic analysis of interactions between different stakeholders, this analysis 
has to integrate factors that operate at the societal level in addition to the individual level. 
Law and politics are such factors. Culture is another factor that is regularly mentioned in the 
comparative branch of the stockholder-stakeholder debate. Yet societal-level analysis is an 
aspect about which current economic theory faces significant challenges.
6
 Erik Berglöf & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm : 
Implications for Transition and Developing Countries, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 135 (1999). 
7 Id. Berglöf and von Thadden further note, in the wake of the financial crises in Asia and Latin 
America, that protecting foreign investors has its limits, as international portfolio investment is a highly volatile 
source of funds and cannot be the centerpiece of a development program.
6Every theory of corporate governance is at heart a theory of power. In this view, the 
corporation is a nexus of power relationships more than a nexus of contracts. The corporate 
setting is rife with agency relationships in which certain parties have the ability (power) 
unilaterally to affect the interests of other parties notwithstanding preexisting contractual 
arrangements. In the present context, corporate fiduciaries are entrusted with the power to 
weigh and prefer the interests of certain constituencies to the interests of others (beyond their 
own self-interest). Given the current limitations of economic theory, progress in the analysis 
of the maximands of corporate governance may be achieved by drawing on additional 
sources of knowledge. This paper points out certain branches of psychology as such sources.
The psychological study of reasoning by policy- and decision-makers in the presence 
of conflicting considerations, or interests, reveals that such reasoning varies systematically. 
Prominent factors found to be relevant in this regard are people’s cognitive style (i.e., their 
typical modes of handling information) and in particular, people’s relative need for cognitive 
closure—to wit, their desire to put an end to deliberation and reach an answer, any answer.8
These factors in turn correlate with people’s political views. Meanwhile, another branch of 
psychology has established that people from different cultures also differ in their cognitive 
styles—among other things, in their treatment of contradiction and their modes of assigning 
responsibility. Finally, in yet another field of psychology, universal models of values at the 
individual and cultural levels have been advanced and validated. These advances seem to be 
taking place independently from one another. An integrative view of these issues has not 
been explicated.
8 See below section II.B.1.
7The theoretical framework developed in this paper is based on an integration of the 
insights suggested by these psychological studies. The psychological analysis thus 
complements the standard economic analysis of the maximands of corporate governance. The 
present theory yields specific, testable hypotheses in regards with both the micro level 
(individual persons or corporations) as well as the macro level (national and international). At 
the micro level, effective corporate governance requires corporate fiduciaries first, to 
overcome their self-interest and second, constantly to coordinate the interests of several 
constituencies. Especially in pressing times—e.g., during economic downturns or in the face 
of a hostile takeover bid—some managers may prove better than others in performing this 
task. These managers will exhibit a lesser need to reach cognitive closure; they will tend to be 
of a liberal more than conservative or libertarian persuasion;9 their individual values would 
emphasize openness to change more than conservation and self-transcendence more than self-
enhancement.10 Other managers would exhibit the opposite qualities more. A continuum of 
management styles exists between these two extremes. It must be stressed from the outset 
that these hypotheses do not imply that the former type of managers would do a better 
managerial job than the latter. The opposite probably would be true in many cases. The point 
is that certain management styles would vary systematically in accordance with managers’ 
personal characteristics.
9
 These titles of political inclinations have special meanings in American politics and may connote 
different meaning in other countries. They are used here for presentation convenience only. Moreover, as will be 
made clear below, it may be problematic to use only a single dimension—e.g., left vs. right—to classify 
ideological positions. See below note 44 and accompanying text.
10
 The concepts mentioned in the text are terms of art. For definitions and theoretical analysis, see
below Section II.B.1.
8Further insights on these issues may be gained by conducting a comparative analysis 
of national corporate governance regimes. In contemplating which line of action to choose, 
corporate decision makers in the U.S. may consider what the law says and also how the 
media and public opinion would respond to their action. In the main, they are likely to prefer 
steps that are publicly palatable. When faced with a similar situation, however, German or 
Korean managers may take different lines of action in light of differences in the social 
environment in which they operate. Assuming the latter managers are equally attentive to the 
tastes of the public palate, the German and Korean styles of corporate governance may give 
greater weight to non-shareholder constituencies compared with the typical American style. 
Stated more generally, managerial action will be affected by what is considered right, 
legitimate, or desirable in the society. This type of analysis is related to but is conceptually 
different than the above reference to managers’ own individual values. In this context, issues 
are analyzed at the general societal level. Social scientists refer to what is considered good, 
right, or desirable in the society as culture. It follows that managers in similar situations may 
reach different decisions depending on the culture in which they operate. At a more 
fundamental level, the law, social norms, and public views are likely to reflect each country’s 
general culture.
While some readers at this point might consider the propositions made above as 
intuitive and self-evident, it should be stressed that this is entirely not the case. This paper in 
fact challenges common wisdom at a number of levels. To begin, the above propositions 
reconcile and integrate conflicting theories in current corporate governance research. More 
generally, these assertions expand the boundaries of the emerging strand of behavioral law 
and economics and its application to corporate governance. These propositions are presented 
9here as testable hypotheses that can be confirmed or refuted empirically. The theory advanced 
in this paper thus suggests a new framework for the assessment of foreign corporate 
governance systems. This theory also lends itself to the design and implementation of 
corporate governance reforms by countries and international bodies alike.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II lays the foundations for the present theory. 
After reviewing basic concepts in the theories of values and cognitive styles, this Part 
integrates them relying on the notion of “value complexity.” It then applies the integrated 
framework to the problem of corporate governance maximands. Part III revisits the American 
stockholder-stakeholder debate. This new reading of the debate highlights the implementation 
problem that has bedeviled all proponents of multiple constituencies as maximands from 
Dodd to contemporary scholars. Part IV seeks to generalize the scope of discussion by 
looking into the field of management studies – a discipline that has been largely ignored by 
most legal commentators. In comparison to legal scholarship, writers in this field have made 
progress that deserves attention and analysis in light of the present theory. Part V further 
extends the analysis by providing a comparative perspective on the maximands problem. This 
Part critically reviews recent trends of convergence and harmonization in corporate 
governance reform and points out their failure to meaningfully address the maximands 
problem. Part VI concludes.
II. FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW THEORY
A. Foreword
Many corporate governance scholars contend that corporate decision makers cannot 
systematically implement the task of advancing the interests of non-shareholder 
10
constituencies in parallel with shareholders’ interests.11 To some, the lack of clearly defined 
implementation methods implies that managers should focus only on shareholder value 
maximization. Others are seemingly unfazed by this implementation problem. Proponents of 
both extreme views, however, put their heads in the sand. The needs and claims of non-
shareholder constituencies must be addressed if the firm is to continue functioning, and 
managers and policy makers can use better advice than simply to deal with problems on an ad 
hoc basis.12 The need to better understand the mechanisms underlying the maximands of 
corporate governance becomes more pressing with the globalization of financial markets. 
Firms and countries alike, both developed and developing, are urged to improve their 
corporate governance. But today, this injunction is narrowly construed as a call for improving 
public/minority shareholder protection from the opportunism of managers and controlling 
shareholders. 
The goal of this Part is to advance a systematic framework for the analysis of the 
maximands of corporate governance. The foundations of this framework are drawn from 
psychological theories that bear on the central controversies in the stockholder-stakeholder 
debate – primarily the problem of dealing with competing claims and the managerial 
confusion they could entail. Using psychology as the underlying discipline of the present 
theory has the advantage of allowing one to address these issues at both the individual and 
societal level and to identify factors that operate at both levels. This framework lends itself to 
deriving testable hypotheses and, where available, empirical evidence will be presented. 
11
 For a detailed exposition of this claim, see below Part III.
12 See below Section III.E.3.
11
Section B reviews dimensional theories of values at the individual and societal levels. 
Section C reviews recent advances in the study of cognitive styles within and across cultures 
with a special focus on the need for cognitive closure. I then offer a new integrative 
framework for discussing these issues. Section D implements this framework to the subject of 
corporate governance maximands. Section E points out supportive evidence.
B. The Value Dimension Framework13
The core concept in the present discussion is values. Values are defined as 
conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g., organizational leaders, 
policy makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain or 
justify their actions and evaluations.14 In this view, values are trans-situational criteria or 
goals (e.g. security, wealth, justice), ordered by importance as guiding principles in life. 
Values are not objective, cold ideas. Rather, when values are activated, they become infused 
with feeling. The trans-situational nature of values means that values transcend specific 
actions and contexts. Obedience, for example, is relevant at work or in school, in sports or in 
business, with family, friends or strangers. 
The ways that societal institutions (e.g., the family, education, economic, political, 
religious systems) function, their goals and their modes of operation, express cultural value 
13
 This Section draws on Peter B. Smith & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values, in 3 H ANDBOOK OF CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 70 (2nd ed., J.W. Berry et al., eds 1997) and Shalom H. Schwartz, Cultural Value 
Differences: Some Implications for Work, 48 APPL’D PSYCHOL. INT’L REV. 23 (1999). Because the current study 
employs the framework developed by Schwartz only this model is described in detail. For a review of theories 
that draw on the individualism/collectivism dimension developed by Geert Hofstede and Harry Triandis, see
Smith & Schwartz, id., at 88-91. This dimension, however, was first formulated in a cultural-level context.
14 See, generally, Clyde Kluckhohn, Value and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action, in TOWARD A 
GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION 383 (Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shils, eds. 1951); MILTON ROKEACH, THE 
NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES (1973); Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: 
12
priorities. Because cultural value priorities are shared, role incumbents in social institutions 
(e.g., leaders in governments, teachers in schools, executive officers of corporations) can 
draw upon them to select socially appropriate behavior and to justify their behavioral choices 
to others (e.g., to go to war, to punish a child, to fire employees). The explicit and implicit 
value emphases that characterize a culture are imparted to societal members through 
everyday exposure to customs, laws, norms, scripts, and organizational practices that are 
shaped by and express the prevailing values.15
Values thus feature at two distinct levels of analysis: individual and societal (or 
cultural). Let us consider them in turn.
1. The Individual Level
A theory-driven analysis of values begins with identifying the fundamental issues 
facing people that define the human condition. Milton Rokeach provided a clear definition of 
values as guiding principles in life and proposed a list of values that was supposed to be 
universal, comprehensive, and exhaustive.16 Shalom Schwartz and Wolfgang Bilsky analyzed 
cross-national data based on a survey instrument developed by Rokeach and confirmed the 
existence of certain value types in each country.17 Later on, Schwartz advanced a 
comprehensive model of individual-level values that represent universal requirements of 
Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1
(M. Zanna ed. 1992).
15 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1972); Hazel R. Markus & Shinobu 
Kitayama, A Collective Fear of the Collective: Implications for Selves and Theories of Selves, 20 PERSONALITY & 
SOC’L PSYCHOL. BULL. 568 (1994).
16 ROKEACH, supra note 14.
17 See Shalom H. Schwartz & Wolfgang Bilsky, Towards a Universal Psychological Structure of 
Human Values, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 550 (1987); Shalom H. Schwartz & Wolfgang Bilsky, 
13
human existence (biological needs, coordination of social interaction, group functioning) as 
motivational goals. Schwartz extended the Rokeach value inventory with values drawn from 
other cultures, including Asian and African ones. Out of fifty-six values items included in this 
inventory, forty-five have been shown to have equivalent content meaning across cultures.18
Table 1 provides definitions of the ten values types distinguished by Schwartz and the value 
items that reflect them.
[Table 1 about here]
An interesting feature of Schwartz’s individual-level model is the structural 
interrelations among value types. These value types can be drawn as segments of a circle. 
Figure 1 depicts this spatial arrangement. Adjacent value types are conceptually close to one 
another whereas opposing value types express conceptually diametrical goals in life. Thus, 
individual persons that put a high emphasis on values of universalism (social justice, 
equality) would also tend to emphasize benevolence values (helpful, honest, etc.). 
Respectively, people that emphasize universalism and benevolence would tend to de-
emphasize values that belong to opposing value types (e.g., achievement versus 
benevolence). 
[Figure 1 about here]
Towards a Theory of Universal Content and Structure of Values, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 878 
(1990).
18
 For instance, “curiosity” has an equivalent meaning across cultures even if people from various 
cultures differ in the importance they ascribe to it as a guiding principle. See Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in 
the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries, in 25 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (M. Zanna Ed. 1992); Shalom H. Schwartz, Are There Universal Aspects 
in the Content and Structure of Values? 50 J. SOC’L ISSUES 19 (1994). For this survey Schwartz also created 
versions of this inventory in other languages using procedures that ensured their language-equivalence.
14
Multidimensional scaling analysis19 has revealed that the values of the ten value types 
distinguished by Schwartz are organized along two bipolar orthogonal dimensions. These 
dimensions reflect a higher level of conceptual commonality among value types. One 
dimension, entitled Self-enhancement versus Self-transcendence, opposes power and 
achievement values to universalism and benevolence values.20 The dimension of Openness to 
change versus Conservation opposes self-direction and stimulation to security, conformity, 
and tradition values. Hedonism values share elements of both Openness to change and Self-
enhancement.21 In sum, the Schwartz model provides a nearly universal description of the 
content and structural relations of human values at the individual level.22
2. The Cultural Level 
Cross-cultural psychologists have made considerable progress over the last two 
decades toward developing a universal analytical framework for comparing cultures.23
Defined in subjective terms, culture is the values, orientations, and underlying assumptions 
19
 For more detail on the empirical methods used in cross-cultural psychological research, see Amir N. 
Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance 
Systems, 26 DELAWARE J. CORP. L. 147, 173-75 (2001).
20
 The names of value dimensions are capitalized throughout to notify that these are terms of art whose 
definitional meaning might differ from the common usage of these words.
21 See Smith & Schwartz, supra note 13, at 87-88.
22
 There is now substantial supportive evidence that the model Schwartz indeed reflects a universal 
structure of human values. See Shalom H. Schwartz et al., Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory 
of Basic Human Values with a Different Method of Measurement, 32 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 519 
(2001); Wolfgang Bilsky & Mareike Koch, On the Content and Structure of Values: Universals or 
Methodological Artefacts?, in SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Jörg Blasius et al.  
Eds. 2002).
23
 The text only summarizes the core features of the two leading models in this field. For a general 
accessible introduction to cross-cultural psychology and additional sources, see Licht, supra note 19. For further 
detail, see Schwartz, supra note 13.
15
that are prevalent among the members of a society.24 A common postulate in cross-cultural 
psychology is that all societies confront similar basic issues or problems when they come to 
regulate human activity. The cultural responses to the basic problems that societies face are 
reflected, among other things, in prevailing value emphases of individuals.25 Because values 
vary in importance, it is possible to characterize societies by the relative importance attributed to 
these values in the society using dimensional models. This yields unique cultural profiles for 
societies or countries.26
One cannot overstate the importance of the distinction between the individual and the 
societal levels of analysis. At the individual level, what is analyzed is the relative importance of 
values for the individual person given the general challenges that he or she faces in conducting 
their life. At the societal level of analysis what is sought are the societal responses to challenges 
that societies face. Although societies do not make conscious decisions or choices they do 
struggle with the need to ensure subsistence, establish social order, etc. – some societies more 
successfully than others. To illustrate the distinction, it may be noted that giving high priority 
to both authority and humility would be incompatible at the individual level: one cannot 
conduct one’s life simultaneously seeking authority and trying to be humble in the same 
24
 This definition is similar to that adopted in studies of the effects of societal development, e.g., 
CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington, 
eds., 2000), and widespread in cross-cultural psychology, e.g., HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
(J.W. Berry, M.H. Segall & C. Kagitcibasi, Eds. 2nd ed. 1997).
25 See, for instance, ROKEACH, supra note 14; FLORENCE R. KLUCKHOHN & FRED L. STRODTBECK, 
VARIATIONS IN VALUE ORIENTATIONS (1961).
26
 In this paper I use “cultural” and “societal” interchangeably because the present focus is on national 
societies. However, it is possible to implement the value dimension framework to study sub-national groups. See
Heather M. Coon & Markus Kemmelmeier, Cultural Orientations in the United States: (Re-)examining 
Differences Among Ethnic Groups 32 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 348 (2001).
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situation.27 At the cultural level, however, these values are compatible. “The societal system 
will run more smoothly if people accept authority as a desirable basis for organizing human 
relations and humility as the appropriate response toward those with greater authority.”28
Thus, the “players” at the two levels of analysis are different, as are the problems they 
face and the answers they give to these problems. In comparing cultures, cross-cultural 
psychologists take advantage of the fact that general societal orientations—namely, culture—are 
reflected in value preferences of individual persons and compare differences in average value 
preferences across societies.29
In the wake of his joint work with Bilsky, Schwartz developed a cultural level theory 
during the 1990s and validated it in survey data that covered some 55,000 respondents in 67 
nations.30 Schwartz derives three bipolar cultural value dimensions from three basic issues he 
identifies as confronting all societies: Embeddedness/Autonomy, Hierarchy/Egalitarianism, 
and Mastery/Harmony. In coping with these issues, societies exhibit greater or lesser emphasis 
on the values at one or the other pole of each dimension. Seven value orientations on which 
cultures can be compared derive from the analysis of the bipolar dimensions. The theory also 
specifies the structure of relations among these types of values. Table 2 provides definitions of 
the cultural value dimensions distinguished by Schwartz. Figure 2 presents graphically the 
relations among the value dimensions and orientations.
27
 Smith & Schwartz, supra note 13, at 82-83.
28 Id., at 83.
29 See PETER B. SMITH & MICHAEL H. BOND, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ACROSS CULTURES: ANALYSIS 
AND PERSPECTIVES 48-49 (2nd ed. 1998).
30 See Schwartz, supra note 13.
17
[Table 2 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
Another pioneering and still influential dimensional framework for characterizing 
cultures was advanced by Geert Hofstede.31 His framework is widely used today in studies on 
management and accounting.32 Hofstede identified four—and later, five—value dimensions: 
Individualism/Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity/Femininity,33
and Long-term Orientation.34 Table 3 provides definitions of the cultural value dimensions 
distinguished by Hofstede.
[Table 3 about here]
31 See GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK-
RELATED VALUES (1980) (hereinafter “CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES 1980”); GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S 
CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2d 
ed. 2001) (hereinafter “CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES”); GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS: 
SOFTWARE OF THE MIND (1991) (hereinafter “SOFTWARE OF THE MIND”). 
32 See Peter B. Smith, The End of the Beginning?, 1 INT’L J. CROSS-CULTURAL MGMT. 21 (2001). See
also STEPHEN P. ROBBINS & MARY COULTER, MANAGEMENT 125-29 (6th ed 1999) (arguing that “[t]he most 
valuable framework to help managers better understand differences between national cultures was developed by 
Geert Hofstede.”); RICHARD MEAD, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT: CROSS-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS (2nd ed. 
1998) (drawing on Hofstede’s theory); Greame Harrison & Jill L. McKinnon, Cross-Cultural Research in 
Management Control System Design: A Review of the Current State, 24 ACTG ORG. & SOC. 483 (1998) (same). 
Hofstede’s work has also stirred objections on various grounds over the years. For a review and discussion of 
common objections, see HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES, id., at 73; see also Ulrich Schimmack, 
Shigehiro Oishi, & Ed Diener, Individualism: A Valid and Important Dimension of Cultural Differences 
(Working paper 2002), available at http://www.erin.utoronto.ca/~w3psyuli/msIndividualism.pdf.
33
 This label has elicited negative responses. Writing originally in 1980, Hofstede was well aware of the 
problematic of attributing certain qualities to particular genders. He nonetheless kept this dimension, arguing 
that it reflects a positive reality that is independent of its normative undesirability. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S 
CONSEQUENCES 1980, supra note 31, at 189-90. In the 2001 edition, Hofstede follows the modern distinction 
between sex and gender and uses the latter term when referring to social function. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S 
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 31, at 280. For further discussions, see GEERT H. HOFSTEDE & WILLEM A. 
ARRINDELL, MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY: THE TABOO DIMENSION OF NATIONAL CULTURES (1998).
34
 This value dimension was not included in Hofstede’s original study. It was added later, in HOFSTEDE,
SOFTWARE OF THE MIND, supra note 31, in light of a study led by Michael Bond. There, it was named 
“Confucian work dynamism.” See Chinese Cultural Connection, Chinese Values and the Search for Culture-
Free Dimensions of Culture, 18 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 143 (1987). Notwithstanding its apparent link to 
18
Based on their value priorities, countries can further be classified into cultural regions. 
Hofstede’s analysis yielded the following regions: Anglo, Germanic, Nordic, two Latin 
regions, two Asian regions (one consisting only of Japan), and Near Eastern.35 Schwartz 
identified six cultural groups of nations: English-speaking, West European, East European, 
Far Eastern, Latin American, and African.36 A broader, more recent sample suggests that the
Far Eastern cultural region comprises two sub-regions: South Asian and Confucian.37
C. Cognitive Styles, Complexity, and Values 
1. The Need for Cognitive Closure and Complexity
One of the basic tasks that people constantly face is to acquire and construct 
knowledge. The cognitive processes of knowledge acquisition are the subject of an ever-
growing psychological literature. Among the factors that influence these processes is the need 
for cognitive closure, defined by Arie Kruglanski as “the desire for a definite answer on some 
topic, any answer as opposed to confusion and ambiguity.”38 The need for cognitive closure 
is primarily motivational. That is, “need” denotes “a motivational tendency or proclivity 
rather than a tissue deficit.”39 Cognitive closure is a goal that can bias individuals’ choices 
Asian cultures it is arguably a universal dimension. Data for this dimension cover a smaller set of countries and 
it is not commonly used in the literature.
35 HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES 1980, supra note 31, at 333 -36. Note that the classification 
into more and less economically developed cultural regions dates from 1980.
36
 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 35-39.
37
 Shalom H. Schwartz, Relations of Culture to Social Structure, Demography and Policy in the Study 
of Nations, invited lecture delivered at the 25th International Congress of Applied Psychology, Singapore, July 
2002 (on file with author). The Confucian region consists of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Singapore, and Japan—though Japan differs some from the others.
38 ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI, LAY EPISTEMICS AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: COGNITIVE AND MOTIVATIONAL 
BASES 14 (1989) (emphasis in the original).
39
 Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna M. Webster, Motivated Closing of the Mind: "Seizing" and "Freezing", 
103 PSYCHOL. REV. 263, 264 (1996).
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when they are faced with the need to acquire new knowledge (including updating existing 
knowledge) in order to make decisions. This is because cognitive processes are costly: they 
take time and entail mental effort. Achieving cognitive closure is thus accompanied by 
positive affective reaction, and vice versa when the attainment of closure is threatened.40
The need for cognitive closure concept is close to similar constructs advanced earlier 
by psychologists such as closed mindedness,41 certainty vs. uncertainty orientation, and need 
for cognition.42 These constructs have been strongly associated with political conservatism—
defined as general resistance to change and endorsement of inequality—in light of a wide 
array of psychological theories that relate political conservatism with “a generalized 
susceptibility to experiencing threat or anxiety in the face of uncertainty.”43 44  The need for 
40
 Lucia Mannetti et al., A Cross Cultural Study of the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale: Comparing 
Its Structure in Croatia, Italy, the USA and the Netherlands, 41 BRIT. J. SOC’L PSYCHOL. 139, 140 (2002).
41 See MILTON ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND THE CLOSED MIND (1960).
42
 Kruglanski & Webster, supra note 39, at 264. Sorrentino and Roney trace the possible roots of 
certainty/uncertainty orientation to people’s early childhood development. RICHARD M. SORRENTINO & 
CHRISTOPHER J.R. RONEY, THE UNCERTAIN MIND: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN FACING THE UNKNOWN 7 
(2000) (“From a psychodynamic approach, the [certainty-oriented person] likely did not make it through the 
oral, anal, and phallic stages of development very successfully. Consequently, this person developed a basic 
mistrust in the world, a lack of sense of autonomy, and a desire to adhere to predictable and familiar worlds.”); 
see also Richard M. Sorrentino & J.A.C. Short, Uncertainty Orientation, Motivation, and Cognition, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 379, 400 (Richard M. 
Sorrentino & E. Tory Higgins Eds. 1986)) (same, but without reference to the phallic stage). Sorrentino and 
Roney note that even without reliance on “the excessive baggage of Freudian and Eriksonian thought that many 
find unpalatable today,” early childhood development probably accounts for certainty versus uncertainly 
orientation. These authors further speculate that these orientations might be related to inborn dispositions. Under 
either theory, such orientation would be difficult to alter in adult age. SORRENTINO & RONEY, id., at 157-58.
43 John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 339, 
347 (2003) (hereinafter Political Conservatism) (citing Glenn D. Wilson, A Dynamic Theory of Conservatism, in 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSERVATISM 257, 259 (Glenn D. Wilson Ed. 1973)). For a critique on this general 
thesis and a forceful rejoinder, see, respectively, Jeff Greenberg & Eva Jonas, Psychological Motives and 
Political Orientation—The Left, the Right, and the Rigid: Comment on Jost et al. (2003), 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
376 (2003); John T. Jost et al., Exceptions That Prove the Rule—Using a Theory of Motivated Social Cognition 
to Account for Ideological Incongruities and Political Anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003), 129 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 383 (2003). Notwithstanding the fact that it summarizes research of several decades, Jost et 
al.’s article raised vocal objections from right-wing groups shortly after its publication in the summer of 2003. 
See, e.g., Vicki Haddock, The Right Stuff: Getting in Touch with the Mussolini Inside: A Trip Inside the 
Conservative Mind is a Perilous Journey Indeed, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 3, 2003, at D2; Byron 
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cognitive closure involves tendencies to “seize” and “freeze” upon information that is readily 
accessible (simply stated: stick to what first comes to mind). Notwithstanding its motivational 
nature, this phenomenon is therefore also referred to as a cognitive style because it relates to 
modes of handling information.45 Individuals differ from one another in their stable degree of 
preference for closure and they differ across situations in the extent to which they are open to 
novel information and are willing to invest the cognitive effort required for adjusting their 
knowledge base.46
Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem have developed and validated a scale (survey 
questionnaire) for measuring the degree of individual need for cognitive closure. Statistical 
analysis revealed that the scale items point to five factors representing this concept: 
preference for order and structure, preference for predictability, decisiveness of judgment and 
York, The “Conservatives Are Crazy” Study: Paid For by Taxpayers, THE NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Aug. 1, 
2003, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york080103.asp; David Fein, Psychological Study Links 
Hitler to Reagan, Limbaugh, available at http://www.crosswalk.com/news/1211434.html (visited Aug. 19, 
2003).
44
 A thorny issue, which the various authors, supra notes 50-43, abstract from, and this paper will 
therefore follow suit, is the validity of classifying political ideologies and orientations along a uni-dimensional 
left-right or conservative-liberal continuum. Philip Tetlock advances the proposition that “it is impossible to 
create a psychometrically defensible one-dimensional measure of ideology.” Tetlock empirically derives two 
such dimensions: high/low traditional conservatism and high/low market libertarianism. Philip E. Tetlock, 
Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Ideological 
Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293 (2001) (citing HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, THE DIMENSIONS OF 
TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983); Donald R. Kinder, Opinion and 
Action in the Realm of Politics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 778 (D. Gilbert et al. Eds. 4th ed. 
1998)). Shalom Schwartz similarly notes that “students of politics have identified two major dimensions of 
political ideology on which parties in various countries are differentiated.” One is concerned with civil liberties 
and law and order; the other with economic issues. Shalom H. Schwartz, Value Priorities and Behavior: 
Applying a Theory of Integrated Value Systems, in ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM ON SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOLOGY: VALUES 1, 10 (Clive Seligman, James M. Olson, & Mark P. Zanna Eds., 1996).
45 See Kruglanski & Webster, supra note 39, at 267; see also John T. Jost, Arie W. Kruglanski, & 
Linda Simon, Effects of Epistemic Motivation on Conservatism, Intolerance, and Other System-Justifying 
Attitudes, in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 93 (L. Thompson, 
J. M. Levine, & D. M. Messick Eds. 1999).
46 See Kruglanski & Webster, supra note 39, at 264.
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choices, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness.47 Recent research shows that the 
need for cognitive closure as captured by the Kruglanski and Webster scale exhibits a similar 
dimensional structure in samples from the United States, Croatia, Italy, and The 
Netherlands,48 and, separately, among Hong Kong Chinese.49 Using this scale, Kruglanski, 
Webster, and colleagues have demonstrated that the need for cognitive closure produces 
similar consequences whether this need was evoked situationally (e.g., by time pressure or by 
ambient noise) or as an individual personality characteristic.50
Thus, the evidence shows that the need for cognitive closure is a universal trait but 
that its actual manifestations vary among individuals and across situations. Research in 
another field of psychology, judgment and decision making, may be helpful in identifying the 
factors that influence this variation. The pivotal observation here is that cognitive processes 
are taxing for individuals. This is strongly evidenced by the phenomenon of cognitive 
heuristics, that allow for fast and frugal reasoning albeit at the price of systematic errors.51
47
 Arie W. Kruglanski,  Donna M. Webster, & Adena Klem, Motivated Resistance and Openness to 
Persuasion in the Presence or Absence of Prior Information, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 861 
(1993); Donna M. Webster & Arie W. Kruglanski, Individual Differences in Need for Cognitive Closure, 67 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 1049 (1994).
48
 Mannetti et al., supra note 40. Note that as this analysis was conducted at the individual level, its 
findings do not indicate that people from different cultures exhibit similar levels of need for closure – only that 
the need for cognitive closure is a construct that could be applied cross-culturally. Mannetti et al. argue, 
however, that the scale items that reflect the decisiveness subdimension are probably susceptible to Western 
cultural bias that values quick decision making. Id., at 152-53. For an application of the need for closure scale in 
Germany without reporting on subdimenstional structure, see Markus Kemmelmeier, Political Orientation and 
Need for Cognitive Closure in German University Students, 137 J. SOC’L PSYCHOL 787 (1997).
49 See Chi-yue Chiu, Michael W. Morris, Ying-yi Hong, & Tanya Menon, Motivated Cultural 
Cognition: The Impact of Implicit Theories on Dispositional Attribution Varies as a Function of Need for 
Closure, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 247 (2000).
50
 For further discussion and concentration of references, see Jost et al., Political Conservatism, supra
note 43, at 348.
51 See GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD, & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT 
MAKE US SMART (2000) (a collection of studies demonstrating how heuristics (“cognitive biases”) can enable 
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Human decision strategies change depending on a number of factors, including the decision’s 
perceived importance, motivation, time pressure, and the complexity of the decision. Payne, 
Bettman and Johnson have emphasized the role of minimizing the cognitive effort involved 
in decision making. They have argued that complex decisions involving many alternatives are 
more taxing and lead people to adopt simplifying heuristics.52
In the economic literature, Sonsino and colleagues have documented “complexity-
aversion”, or “negative complexity effects in choice with uncertainty.” In particular, they 
show that more complex alternatives are less likely to be chosen, and that noise in the choice 
process increases with complexity.53 Cognitive complexity was studied earlier in connection 
with individuals’ political ideology. As defined by Tetlock, individuals’ integrative 
complexity refers to the extent of differentiation among multiple perspectives or dimensions 
and the higher order integration or synthesis of these differentiated components.54 In political 
decision making of voters, cognitive heuristics are at times employed by almost all voters, 
and that they are particularly likely to be used when the choice situation facing voters is 
complex.55
both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, judgments, and predictions by employing 
bounded rationality).
52 JOHN W. PAYNE, JAMES R. BETTMAN, & ERIC J. JOHNSON, THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 29-41
(1993); see also James R. Bettman, Eric J. Johnson, &  John W. Payne, A Componential Analysis of Cognitive 
Effort in Choice, 45 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 111 (1990).
53 See Doron Sonsino, Uri Benzion, Galit Mador, The Complexity Effects on Choice with Uncertainty –
Experimental Evidence, 112 ECON. J. 936, 937 (2002); see also Doron Sonsino & Marvin Mandelbaum, On 
Preference for flexibility and Complexity Aversion – Experimental Evidence, 51 EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE, 
THEORY AND DECISION 197 (2001) (showing that increasing the number of options produces a negative 
complexity effect).
54 See Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Style and Political Ideology, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 
118 (1983); Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Style and Political Belief Systems in the British House of Commons, 46 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 365 (1984).
55 See Richard Lau & David Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in 
Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SC. 951 (2001)
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Taken together, this evidence points to the likely connection between complexity and 
the need for cognitive closure—namely, more complex tasks entail greater cognitive effort, 
which more strongly invokes the need for cognitive closure. Research in cultural psychology 
supports this proposition in demonstrating that when the level of need for cognitive closure 
rises, people are more likely to fall back on “standard solutions” to problems suggested by 
their culture. In ambiguous, complex social interactions, culture provides easily accessible 
heuristics for reaching satisfactory solutions. These solutions differ systematically with 
people’s culture, however.56
Examination of the content of the need for closure construct suggests that it is closely 
related to the Conservation versus Openness to change dimension (see Table 1). The 
subscales that are captured in Kruglanski and Webster’s scale and the items that reflect them 
overlap conceptually with the values of security, tradition, and conformity in Schwartz’s 
model on the one hand versus self-direction and stimulation values on the other hand. The 
emphasis on preserving the status quo—whether real or an imaginary ideal thereof (consider 
“preserving family values”)—is especially clear in such value items as respect for tradition, 
honoring parents and elders, and social order. The preference for certainty over ambiguity 
and change is also reflected in seemingly innocuous value items like cleanliness that convey a 
sense of clarity.57
56 See Ho-Ying Fu & Michael W. Morris, Which Romans Do "as Romans Do"? Individual Differences 
in Conformity to Cultural Conflict Resolution Scripts, (Working paper 2002), available at 
http://gobi.stanford.edu/researchpapers/detail1.asp?Paper_No=1660 (showing that both American and Chinese 
subjects with higher levels of need for cognitive closure tended to rely more on their cultures’ (different) 
standard scripts for dispute resolution); Chiu et al., supra note 49, at 256 (“What cultural knowledge provides to 
the individual is a set of highly accessible cognitive tools that can be applied to a problem to reach a quick 
interpretation and articulation of one’s answer.”) Note that these findings also corroborate the evidence that 
individuals’ behavior tends to comply with their values. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
57 Cf. Jost et al., Political Conservatism, supra note 43, at 346.
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The need for closure may also be related to the Self-enhancement versus Self-
transcendence dimension. Self-transcendence, reflected in values of benevolence and 
universalism, calls for considering multiple others in addition to considering oneself. To the 
extent that values participate significantly in affecting behavioral choices, people who see 
merit in multiple considerations would exhibit lesser need to reach cognitive closure, and vice 
versa for individuals who are higher on power and achievement values. Studies done by 
Philip Tetlock and colleagues indirectly support these hypotheses and the association of 
higher need for cognitive closure with political conservatism.58 Studies by Schwartz and 
colleagues demonstrate relations of value priorities to behavior, some of it directly relevant to 
the liberal-conservative distinction.59 Further research of this subject is clearly warranted.
The above findings and observations suggest that the need for cognitive closure can 
be more systematically related to Schwartz’s universal model of individual value dimensions. 
I propose that the notion of complexity may be a helpful organizing element for this purpose. 
58 See, e.g., Tetlock, supra note 44; Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and 
Choice: Toward a Social Contingency Model, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 331 
(Mark P. Zanna, Ed. 1992); Philip E. Tetlock, L. Skitka, & R. Boettger, Social and Cognitive Strategies for 
Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL.
632 (1989). For further discussion, see Philip E. Tetlock & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Social Contingency Model: 
Identifying Empirical and Normative Boundary Conditions on the Error-and-Bias Portrait of Human Nature, in 
DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 571 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope, Eds. 1999); Jennifer 
S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and Social Cognition, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
(1994).
59 See Schwartz, supra note 44; Marina Barnea & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Voting, 19 
POLITICAL PSYCHOL. 17 (1998); Anat Bardi & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Behavior: Strength and 
Structure of Relations, PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. BULL (forthcoming 2003). To be sure, the path from 
values to behavior is complicated and involves several mediating factors. One would be misguided to expect a 
unique deterministic link between values and behavior—in the least, because many values that belong to 
opposing value types are viewed positively by many people (see Table 1), such that contradicting values may be 
activated as a matter of course. Cf. C. M., Kristiansen, & A. M. Hotte, Morality and the Self: Implications for 
When and How of Value-Attitude-Behavior Relations. in ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM ON SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOLOGY: VALUES 77 (Clive Seligman, James M. Olson, & Mark P. Zanna Eds., 1996) (questioning the 
causal relations between values and behavior); Kwok Leung, Michael Harris Bond, & Shalom H. Schwartz, 
How to Explain Cross-Cultural Differences: Values, Valences, and Expectancies?, 1 ASIAN J. PSYCHOL. 70 
(1995) (discussing mediating factors).
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In line with research on complexity and cognitive effort, greater complexity is associated 
with a greater number of relevant elements worthy of consideration and higher uncertainty 
and ambiguity. Values therefore may differ in the level of complexity they feature. Values 
whose subject is multifaceted or involves multiple issues (persons, entities, etc.) or is more 
ambiguous may be deemed more complex, and vice versa. In this view, Openness to change 
and Self-transcendence may be considered more complex than Conservation and Self-
enhancement, respectively. 
It follows that adhering to values of the former two dimensional poles entails greater 
cognitive complexity than adhering to values of the latter poles. Hence, compliance with 
higher-complexity values would be more likely to induce a need for cognitive closure in 
individuals. After all, if the need for cognitive closure can vary as a function of internal 
individual traits and external environmental circumstances, one may be justified in expecting 
similar variance as a function of the object of behavior—specifically, as a function of the 
complexity of values that underlie such behavior.
2. Cognitive Styles Across Cultures
For several decades, most psychologists have assumed that basic cognitive processes 
are universal: Every human being is equipped with the same set of attentional, memorial, 
learning, and inferential procedures.60 Cognitive scientists’ endorsement of the universalistic 
60
 This is only one basic assumption out of several. The literature on culture and cognition is 
outpouring. For sample reviews, on which the following paragraphs draw liberally, see Richard E. Nisbett & 
Ara Norenzayan, Culture and Cognition, in STEVENS' HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: COGNITION 
561 (D. L. Medin Ed. 3d Ed. 2001); Richard E. Nisbett et al., Cultures as Systems of Thought: Holistic versus 
Analytic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291 (2001); Kaiping Peng, Daniel R. Ames, & Eric Knowles, Culture 
and Human Inference, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 245 (D. Matsumoto Ed. 2001); Alan P. 
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position was encouraged by the analogy between the human mind and the computer: brain = 
hardware, cognitive procedures = operating principles and factory-installed software.61 The 
heuristics and biases movement started by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky encouraged 
the view that procedures such as judgment of probability by the representativeness heuristic 
and judgment of frequency by the availability heuristic, were primary, universal, and difficult 
to alter.62
Evidence that has accumulated mostly since the late 1990s now casts doubt on the 
universality assumption about cognitive processes. Among other things, studies indicate that 
cognitive styles differ markedly across cultures. That is, people from different cultures 
perceive, understand, and judge the world in systematically different ways. Cultural 
differences in cognitive processes are further tied to cultural differences in basic assumptions 
about the nature of the world. Cultural practices encourage and sustain certain kinds of 
cognitive processes, which then perpetuate these cultural practices.63
The vast majority of empirical studies compared Western subjects (mostly American) 
with East Asian subjects (mostly Chinese and Korean). For instance, Americans were more 
inclined to assign causality and responsibility to individual group members in agency 
situations, while the Asians were more inclined to assign causality to attributes of the group 
Fiske et al., The Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 915 (D. T. 
Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey Eds., 4th ed. 1998).
61
 Nisbett & Norenzayan, id., at 561 (citing N. Block, The Mind as the Software of the Brain, in 
THINKING: AN INVITATION TO THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE 377 (E. E. Smith & D. N. Osherson Eds.1995)). Note, 
anecdotally, that Hofstede considered culture to be the software of the mind. HOFSTEDE, SOFTWARE OF THE 
MIND, supra note 31.
62
 Nisbett & Norenzayan, supra note 61, at 561. For a law-oriented discussion, see Donald C. 
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998). See also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
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as a whole.64 In explaining causes of behavior, Asians more than Americans placed credence 
on situational and interactional factors.65 Asians were also better able than Americans to 
recognize the influence of situational constraints on individual behavior: Americans were 
more susceptible to the fundamental attribution error.66 On the other hand, Asians were more 
susceptible to the hindsight bias, believing that they could have predicted outcomes that in 
fact one could not have predicted.67 This finding may stem from the fact that in analyzing a 
situation, Asians consider more factors as relevant than Americans do.68
To conceptualize the differences between subjects’ cultures, cultural psychologists 
draw on the distinction between conceptions of the self as independent versus interdependent, 
suggested by Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama.69 In this view, the Western construal of 
the self is characterized by a sense of autonomy and distinctiveness from others. In the East 
Asian construal of the self, one’s identity is diffused socially across significant others in 
63
 Nisbett & Norenzayan, supra note 61, at 561-62.
64
 Tanya Menon et al., Culture and the Construal of Agency: Attribution to Individual versus Group 
Dispositions, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 701 (1999).
65
 Ara Norenzayan, Incheol Choi, & Richard E. Nisbett, Cultural Similarities and Differences in Social 
Inference: Evidence from Behavioral Predictions and Lay Theories of Behavior, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC’L 
PSYCHOL. BUL. 109 (2002). 
66
 Incheol Choi & Richard E. Nisbett, Situational Salience and Cultural Difference in the 
Correspondence Bias and Actor-Observer Bias, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. BUL. 949 (1998). 
Originally thought to be a universal phenomenon, the fundamental attribution error, also known as the 
correspondence bias, is people’s tendency to consistently ignore external situational explanations in favor of 
internal dispositional explanations. This means that people are more likely to conclude that something about the 
person caused her behavior rather than something about the situation, even when the situation already provides 
an adequate explanation. See Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Short-comings: Distortions in the 
Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed. 
1977).
67
 Incheol Choi & Richard E. Nisbett, The Cultural Psychology of Surprise: Holistic Theories and 
Recognition of Contradiction, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL 890 (2000).
68
 Incheol Choi, R. Dalal, C. Kim-Prieto, & Hyekyong Park, Culture and Judgment of Causal 
Relevance, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 46 (2003).
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one’s in-group.70 These polar views are close to the polar orientations on Schwartz’s 
Autonomy/Embeddedness dimension. They are also reminiscent of, but not identical to 
Hofstede’s and Harry Triandis’ Individualism/Collectivism distinction.71 Explanations for 
these and many other striking cultural differences in cognitive styles call upon differences in 
reasoning traditions that go back to ancient times – possibly to the era of Confucius and 
Aristotle.72
Compared with other aspects of cognition, relatively less attention so far has been 
paid to the need for cognitive closure across cultures. It is now assumed that in addition to 
individual characteristics and environmental factors, culture may also affect the level of 
people’s need for cognitive closure. This hypothesis is inspired by Hofstede’s Uncertainty 
Avoidance dimension.73 It should be emphasized, however, that the need for cognitive 
closure construct applies at the individual level, not the societal level. Societies do not 
perform cognitive processes and they cannot experience a need for cognitive closure in the 
sense defined by Kruglanski as “a desire for a definite answer… any answer.” 
Preliminary evidence suggests that people in different cultures vary in their typical 
level of need for cognitive closure. Chiu et al. administered the Kruglanski and Webster scale 
to Hong Kong Chinese and to non-Asian Americans. They found that compared to the 
Chinese participants, Americans participants scored lower on the subscales that reflect 
69
 Hazel R. Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self: Implication for Cognition, Emotion, 
and Motivation, 98 PYSCHOL. REV. 224 (1991).
70
 Peng et al., supra note 60, at 248.
71 See HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM (1995).
72 See Fiske et al., supra note 60, at 322-24.
73 See Jost et al., Political Conservatism, supra note 43, at 348 (citing Hofstede).
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preference for predictability, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness. Americans 
scored higher on the subscale of decisiveness; they had a greater preference for a quick and 
confident decision on one best solution to a problem.74 This finding, the authors argue, is in 
line with broader views in the cultural psychology literature on cognitive styles.75
Compared with Western systems of thought, the East Asian systems of thought (as 
these are conceptualized in this literature) are more holistic. According to Nisbett et al., the 
holistic approach, as opposed to the Western analytic thought, puts “an emphasis on change, 
a recognition of contradiction and of the need for multiple perspectives, and a search for the 
"Middle Way" between opposing propositions.”76 East Asian subjects have been found to be 
more tolerant to apparent contradictions and in fact exhibit a clear preference for 
contradicting, dialectical statements.77 The metaphor of cultures as “systems of thought” 
vividly captures this pattern.78
3. Cultural Orientations, Complexity, and Need for Closure 
The aforementioned evidence raises the question whether we should expect a 
systematic relationship to exist between cultural orientations and societal stances toward 
cognitive closure? In line with the proposition regarding the individual level, I propose that 
such relationships are to be expected, and argue that these relationships may be better 
understood in light of the notion of complexity. At the societal level, cultural orientations too 
74
 Chiu et al., supra note 49, at 252. On the relations between these subscales see supra note 48.
75 See Chiu et al., supra note 49, at 252-53.
76
 Nisbett et al., supra note 60, at 11.
77 See Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics, and Reasoning about Contradiction, 54 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741 (1999).
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may be considered more complex if adherence to their values necessitates consideration of a 
greater number of relevant factors or should be more nuanced. Let us thus examine which 
cultural orientations may be considered more cognitively demanding to comply with.
In this analysis, Embeddedness and Egalitarianism imply greater complexity. Social 
appropriateness in high Embeddedness societies depends on preserving relationships with 
numerous others, the Confucian ideal of social structure that rests on the “Five Relationships” 
being a prime example.79 In contrast, the focus of Autonomy is primarily on the thoughts and 
feeling of the individual. The thoughts and feelings of others are of secondary importance. 
Stated otherwise, an East Asian likely has many more “significant others” than a Western 
person. The literature on the Asian holistic, multifaceted system of thought extends this 
pattern to non-human contexts as well. Conducting one’s life in an idea-type Confucian 
society thus may be more cognitively demanding. 
Egalitarianism similarly implies greater complexity than Hierarchy. Egalitarianism 
emphasizes the moral equality of people such that numerous societal members or groups are 
seen as relevant factors for decision. An egalitarian cultural orientation therefore appears 
more cognitively demanding as it invites deliberation over pros and cons and weighing of 
multiple claims. Speedy attainment of cognitive closure may be detrimental to this process 
and may therefore be discouraged in egalitarian cultures. In contrast, Hierarchy connotes a 
clear social order in which people know their place relative to one another and can more 
78 See Nisbett et al., supra note 60.
79
 Formulated by classical Chinese philosophers, this concept states that there should be affection 
between father and son, righteousness between ruler and minister, attention to their separate functions between 
husband and wife, proper order between old and young, and faithfulness between friends.
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easily ascertain whose judgment should prevail in social interactions. Hierarchy simplifies 
things considerably by legitimizing what comes from above.
The Harmony/Mastery dimension may be more ambiguous in what regards its 
complexity. Harmony appears to entail greater complexity than Mastery in that Harmony 
expresses an integrative view of the natural and social world. People in societies high on 
Harmony are encouraged to internalize this view and subject their desires to some general 
order that they need to comprehend. In contrast, Mastery calls on people to change things at 
their own initiative, thus implying less consideration for others. The latter orientation, 
however, entails greater uncertainty that people are expected to adjust to.
Societies whose cultural orientations are more complex should develop means for 
accommodating the greater cognitive load that these orientations impose on societal 
members. As cultures evolve over generations, they may adopt strategies for allowing 
societal members to optimize the cognitive effort required for complying with their values.80
One strategy for facilitating optimization of cognitive effort bears on the payoffs from 
engaging in it by individuals. Along this line, cultures may develop social norms that 
encourage or discourage speedy attainment of cognitive closure. Thus, people who live in 
societies characterized by high-complexity cultural orientations would be socially rewarded 
for their ability to withstand the enhanced need for cognitive closure. (and vice versa). This 
social esteem would compensate people for the potential disutility of the extended cognitive 
80
 The text anthropomorphizes cultures but it should be obvious that cultures do not consciously choose 
strategies. This usage is common shorthand for non-human players, however.
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process.81 Because multifacetedness and ambiguity are inherent to the promotion of societal 
values, it may not be surprising if satisfying the desire for cognitive closure would be 
perceived as immature in these cultures.
An alternative strategy for dealing with greater complexity is, simply put, to lower the 
pressure. When a particular culture puts greater emphasis on values, whose promotion 
typically entails greater cognitive effort, societal members may develop a cognitive style that, 
on average, gives lesser importance to reaching cognitive closure. By contrast, societies 
whose values generally call for narrowing the focus of attention will also socialize their 
members to be intolerant to lengthy and convoluted reasoning. 
Finally, cultures could develop institutions that reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity 
perceived by societal members (perhaps irrespectively to the complexity of cultural 
orientations). This is the thrust of Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance dimension. Such 
mechanisms can take on various forms, from inhibiting multiple choices to setting fixed 
scripts to encouraging deference to seniors and so forth. Schwartz’s model of cultural value 
dimensions does not feature a close parallel to Uncertainty Avoidance although low Harmony 
is somewhat close to low Uncertainty Avoidance.82
The strategies postulated above operate in opposite directions. The upshot is that 
greater complexity of a society’s cultural orientations does not necessarily entail that its 
81 See, generally, Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 338 (1997) (proposing a model of social norms based on costless social esteem and opprobrium).
82
 Schwartz notes that “Harmony might seem to overlap conceptually with uncertainty avoidance, since 
both idealize an harmonious order. However, harmony stresses that people and nature should exist comfortably 
together without assertion of control. In contrast, uncertainty avoidance emphasizes controlling ambiguity and 
unpredictability through institutions and beliefs that provide certainty. Harmony and uncertainty avoidance 
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members will on average exhibit higher levels of need for cognitive closure. Every society 
may have a normal distribution of individuals with high and low need for cognitive closure 
and average levels could vary in accordance with different cultural profiles.83 Yet the extant 
evidence from Chui et al. remains suggestive at this stage. Although we have a fair picture of 
the working of the need for closure within cultures, more cross-cultural analysis that employs 
careful standardization is warranted.84
D. Values, Cognitive Styles, and Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is the framework that defines the division of power in the 
corporation. This division of power in turn determines the division of wealth created by the 
corporation. Oftentimes, the regulation of power in the corporation—either of managers or 
controlling shareholders—is subsumed under the rubric of “accountability.” For instance, the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance define the role of the board in terms of 
accountability to the company and the shareholders.85 In the context of the maximands of 
corporate governance the debate is framed as accountability only to shareholders versus 
accountability to multiple constituencies or stakeholders. The latter may be called 
“accountees.” In addition to identifying the parties who owe and who are owed 
share about 6% of their variance.” Shalom H. Schwartz, Mapping and Interpreting Cultural Differences around 
the World, in COMPARING CULTURES (Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters & Peter Ester Eds. forthcoming 2003).
83
 It is implicitly assumed here that genetic differences that may affect the average level of need for 
cognitive closure do not exist among societies. Relaxing this assumption does not alter the analysis although it is 
relevant for actual average levels, of course.
84
 On the potential importance of standardization in cross-cultural research see Ulrich Schimmack, 
Shigehiro Oishi, & Ed Diener, Individualism: A Valid and Important Dimension of Cultural Differences 
(Working paper 2002), available at http://www.erin.utoronto.ca/~w3psyuli/msIndividualism.pdf.
85 AD HOC TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, DOCUMENT SG/CG (99) 5, 9 (1999), Principle V (“The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the 
board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.”). For a critical analysis of the OECD Principle, see
below, text to note 322 et seq.
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accountability, a full description of accountability relationships also must specify the content 
of the duties it entails.
In social psychology, “[a]ccountability refers to the implicit or explicit expectation of 
decision makers that they may be called upon to justify their beliefs, feelings, and actions to 
others… [It is] a universal feature of social life that inevitably arises from the norm-
enforcement needs of groups and organizations.”86 Societies establish accountability systems 
in order to cope with common problems in group life. Accountability practices are crucial for 
establishing social order in that they serve as a feedback mechanism between parties to power 
relationships in rule and norm enforcement. In other words, accountability is the “social 
psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on 
the other.”87 The concept of accountability has deep roots in English traditions.88
Nevertheless, it is now commonly being used as a general term to describe who should bear 
responsibility to whom.89
In the Anglo-American legal and political tradition accountability entails promoting 
the accountee’s interests, transparency and reporting, and liability to make amends for 
86
 Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and Social Cognition, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1, 1 (1994).
87 G. R. SEMIN & A.S.R. MANSTEAD, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CONDUCT: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1983), cited by Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 86, at 1-2.
88 See Amir N. Licht, Accountability and Corporate Governance, (working paper 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=328401; Melvin Dubnick, Clarifying Accountability, in 
PUBLIC SECTOR ETHICS: FINDING AND IMPLEMENTING VALUES 68, 69 (Charles Samford et al., ed. 1998).
89 See Licht, id. For a representative description of public sector accountability in the United States, see
Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 6 (Jay M. Shafritz, ed. 1998) (“A relationship in which an individual or agency is 
held to answer for performance that involves some delegation of authority to act… [which performance is] 
expected by some significant “other”… accountability is a generic form of social relationship found in a variety 
of contexts… [A]ccountabiltiy does not necessarily imply the existence of democracy; rather, it suggests any 
form of governance conducted through some delegation of authority.”)
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misdeeds.90 American courts thus have used strong language to describe their loathing of 
people in fiduciary relationships who derive private benefits from their power position 
without making full disclosure to their accountees.91 The precise scope of the accountability 
duties owed by corporate fiduciaries may differ from those of other actors in fiduciary 
relationships, but the deep suspicion towards transactions that involve conflict of interest is a 
dominant feature of American corporate law.92 As part III demonstrates, the entire 
stockholder-stakeholder debate revolves around the permissible use of power in the relations 
of corporate constituencies. This debate is less about the need to overcome fiduciaries’ self-
interest (over which there is consensus) than about reconciling the conflicting interests of 
several constituencies by corporate fiduciaries.
The current theoretical framework highlights the strength with which these basic 
issues are tied to psychological and cultural elements. Accountability regimes that define the 
division of power and wealth in corporations are determined by a host of factors ranging from 
legal rules to court decisions to social norms. Individual corporate decision makers eventually 
decide situations that are not directly and exhaustively governed by these social institutions. 
None of these factors can sensibly be assumed to be immune to the impact of politics and 
culture and, more fundamentally, the psych of the people involved. The aforementioned 
90 See Licht, id.
91
 Consider Judge Cardozo’s famous admonition in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 
1928):
“Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are 
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market 
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to 
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the 
attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating 
erosion" of particular exceptions... Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher 
than that trodden by the crowd.”
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theory and evidence suggest that people tend to behave in consonance with their values. 
Pressure to reach decisions rises in tandem with the need for cognitive closure. The pressure 
also rises when the situation is vague, when several options need to be weighed against one 
another, and when decision makers expect to be held accountable for their decisions. When 
under increased pressure to reach a decision, people resort to their shared implicit cultural 
knowledge.
The upshot of this reasoning is that accountability mechanisms may look and function 
in fundamentally different ways according to the personal characteristics of the people 
involved and the to the social environment (country) in which they interact. To get a flavor of 
this contextuality, briefly consider the typical Anglo-American version of accountability in 
corporate settings, which is explored in more detail below. Through its focus on conflicts of 
interest, this accountability style strongly resonates with the Autonomy orientation that 
perceives individuals as socially alienated from one another. The Anglo-American 
accountability also echoes with Hierarchy in that it presupposes power relationships between 
the accountable and the accountee.93 Hence its legitimation of certain economic outcomes of 
power differences in the corporation and by curbing others. By narrowing its focus to a single 
accountee, this governance norm facilitates the functioning of corporate fiduciaries with 
higher levels of need for cognitive closure. 
92
 For a through review, see ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 160-80 (1986).
93
 As originally noted by Ronald Coase, The Nature of The Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); reprinted 
in 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 3 (1988), and later elaborated on by OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985), hierarchy is the constitutive feature of the firm as opposed to market-
based transactions. Although hierarchy in firms (and other organizations) is inevitable, societal stances may vary 
in what regards the desirability of its outcomes (e.g., economic inequality). The Schwartz cultural-level 
dimension of Hierarchy-Egalitarianism refers to such differences in societal emphases.
37
It follows, however, that managers with lower need for cognitive closure and with 
individual value emphases that give greater weight to complex values may feel overly 
restrained by such a norm. At the societal level, public opinion in societies that score higher 
on Embeddedness or Egalitarianism may consider Anglo-American accountability as anti-
social because the latter expresses different views on the proper place of individuals in 
society and on proper social structures. Thus, the very notion of “conflict of interest” takes on 
a different meaning in a high Embeddedness society, in which the individual self is perceived 
as an interdependent entity in a large array of other social members. As a result, basic 
institutions from the standard American corporate governance toolkit—e.g., the independent 
director—may be incompatible with East Asian corporate governance systems, or at least 
produce different outcomes.94 These differences also may have far-reaching implications on 
corporate decisions, because managers appear to be very attentive to public opinion.95
Granted, economic incentives to individuals and nations alike also participate in 
determining the structure of corporate governance. For instance, financial markets exert 
pressure on corporations and decision makers generally to protect the interests of investors of 
capital, namely, shareholders and creditors. It would be a mistake, however, to consider 
market forces as exogenous. Economic forces and the signals they convey to corporate and 
political decision makers through market prices are endogenous to corporate governance. 
 In this view, the dividing line between the market and the firm is delineated according to the relative 
transaction costs entailed be performing a task in each of the former. 
94 See Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance 
Reform, BERKELEY J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2003). 
95 See I.J. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media (CRSP 
Working Paper No. 543 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=335602 (providing 
evidence that media affect companies’ policy toward the environment and the amount of corporate resources 
that are diverted to the sole advantage of controlling shareholders).
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Nevertheless, subject to these restraints, there is ample room for decision makers to take 
different actions as long as they can reasonably justify them to themselves and to their 
surrounding social environment.
1. Testable Hypotheses
We are now in a position to generate testable hypotheses about the relations between 
values, need for cognitive closure, and corporate governance. Specifically, the foregoing 
theoretical discussion suggests several hypotheses concerning the maximands of corporate 
governance and the endorsement of shareholder value versus multiple constituency interests 
as the maximand. The reasoning behind these hypotheses is simple and follows closely from 
the discussion above. Few and relatively straightforward as these hypotheses may be, the 
subsequent parts will show that their implications have been hotly debated for decades 
without showing signs of reaching resolution.
 The first main hypothesis concerns the individual level. In this context, people in 
decision-making positions in corporations or involved in policy making are expected 
to be more receptive to multiple-constituency corporate governance the more they 
emphasize the values of Openness to change versus Conservation and, perhaps more 
weakly, values of Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement. Vice versa for 
shareholder value maximization.
 A corollary hypothesis is that people’s endorsement of multiple-constituency 
corporate governance would decrease the higher is their typical level of need for 
cognitive closure.
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 Another corollary hypothesis predicts that endorsement of multiple-constituency 
corporate governance would correlate positively with liberal political persuasion 
whereas endorsement of shareholder-oriented corporate governance would correlate 
positively with political conservatism.
 The second main hypothesis concerns the societal level. Here it is expected that 
societies that put greater emphasis on Embeddedness and Egalitarianism will have 
corporate governance systems that are more stakeholder-oriented. The same may be 
true for societies high on Harmony. In contrast, societal emphases on Autonomy, 
Hierarchy, and Mastery would be accompanied by stronger endorsement of 
shareholder value maximization.
E. Some Evidence
Empirical evidence that bears directly on the issues raised here, albeit limited at this 
stage, is consistent with the above hypotheses. In this Section, I concentrate the available 
evidence. Together with additional evidence, it will be put in more detailed context in 
subsequent parts.
Let us again begin at the individual level. A study by Tetlock investigated the 
relations between American managers’ political positions and need for cognitive closure on 
the one hand and their views on a variety of organizational problems on the other hand.96
Among other things, subjects were presented with scenarios that confronted shareholders’ 
versus multiple stakeholders’ interests as the goal of corporations. Traditional conservatives 
and modern libertarians ranked high on the need for cognitive closure scale and were also 
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more favorable to management that endorsed accountability to shareholders only. Lower 
scorers on these scales praised management that endorsed the pluralistic regime of 
accountability to stakeholders. Follow-up in-depth interviews with participants provided 
further support to the quantitative statistical results.97
Analysis at the societal level is based on comparative studies. A well-known survey 
by Charles Hampden-Turner and Fons Tropmenaars has found suggestive evidence for 
significant relations between culture and stakeholder issues. These researchers surveyed 
international managers from several countries and asked them about their attitudes toward 
corporate profit. Specifically, managers were asked to choose one of the following as an 
accurate statement of the proper goal of a company: “(a) The only real goal of a company is 
making profit. (b) A company, besides making profit, has a goal of attaining the well-being of 
various stakeholders, such as employees, customers, etc.”98 Four English-speaking countries 
ranked highest in endorsing profit-only goal (i.e., shareholder value) among the twelve 
96
 Tetlock, supra note 44.
97
 Tetlock, id., vividly summarizes these interviews: “Conservatives understood stakeholder concerns 
and the necessity of taking them into account as a means to the end of profit maximization. But they feared that 
egalitarian efforts to promote the stakeholder vision rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of both human 
nature and of capitalism that would impair long-term growth by enmeshing corporate executives in ever more 
elaborate webs of communitarian regulations (“You can’t do anything until the local politicians, labor unions, 
environmentalists, minority-rights activists, and other assorted opportunists have all had their palms crossed 
with silver”) and by creating an inexhaustible source of excuses for poorly performing managers to put off long-
suffering shareholders (as one freshly minted MBA pontificated, “the stakeholder model aggravates the 
principal-agent problem at the heart of corporate capitalism – it gives agents too much wiggle room to evade 
their responsibility to promote the principal’s interest”).”
98 CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER & ALFONS TROMPENAARS, THE SEVEN CULTURES OF CAPITALISM 32 
(1993). This question essentially replicates the famous “Friedman Doctrine” which stated that “the social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits.” See below note 162 and accompanying text.
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countries represented in this study, with the United States ranking at the top of the list. In 
contrast, Germany, France, Singapore, and Japan ranked lowest.99
Lilach Sagiv and Shalom Schwartz have reanalyzed data compiled by Hampden-
Turner and Tropmenaars on managers’ preferences about solving social dilemmas in 
organizations. Specifically, managers who “analyze phenomena into parts (i.e., items, tasks, 
numbers, units, points, specifics)” were differentiated from those who “integrate and 
configure such details into whole patterns, relationships and wider contexts.”100 As 
hypothesized by Sagiv and Schwartz and in line with the above hypothesis on complexity, 
managers in nations with cultures that emphasize Harmony tended to choose the integrating 
option over the analyzing option for solving social dilemmas.
III. THE AMERICAN DEBATE REVISITED
The most puzzling feature of the stockholder-stakeholder debate is its longevity. 
American courts adjudicated the core issue—namely, the supremacy of shareholders’ interest 
in the corporation—during the 1910s. The scholarly debate between corporate law giants 
Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd is often said to have been “settled” during the 1930s, arguably 
in favor of Dodd’s view. The discord over this issue resurfaced repeatedly, however, as 
scholars, courts and legislators continued to address it. At the beginning of the new century, 
99
 Ranking in the middle were Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Id., id. Unfortunately, a 
more recent version of this study does not report results for this question. See FONS TROMPENAARS AND 
CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER, RIDING THE WAVES OF CULTURE: UNDERSTANDING THE CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN 
BUSINESS (1997).
100
 Lilach Sagiv & Shalom H. Schwartz, A New Look at National Culture: Illustrative Applications to 
Role Stress and Managerial Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CLIMATE. 417 (Neal 
M. Ashkanasy, Celeste P.M. Wilderom, & Mark F. Peterson Eds. 2000) (referring to HAMPDEN-TURNER & 
TROMPENAARS, supra note 98, at 10-11).
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exchanges between holders of the two views continue unabated, indeed with greater intensity 
than ever before. 
This Part provides a new reading of the debate over the maximands of corporate 
governance. By critically reviewing the intellectual history of the central positions made in 
this debate, this Part will identify the issues over which there is wide consensus and, more 
importantly, which issues remain unresolved. This Part will then demonstrate how the 
theoretical framework put forward in Part II improves our understanding of this controversy. 
Following an analysis of the landmark decision in Dodge v. Ford in Section A, Section B 
derives new insights from the details of the Berle-Dodd dialogue. Sections C and D briefly 
review the (non)development of the stockholder-stakeholder debate from the 1950s through 
the 1990s. Section E takes a more theory-oriented perspective and reviews the development 
of analyses from traditional economic ones, to progressive views, to recent hierarchical 
models of the corporation. Section F connects the debate to the theoretical framework in the 
preceding Part.
A. Dodge v. Ford 
In the summer of 1915, the board of directors of the Ford Motor Company approved a 
plan to expand the company’s production capacity to 1,000,000 cars annually. The plan also 
called for a reduction in the price per Model T car from $440 to $360 although the market 
apparently could sustain the higher price even if for a lower volume. It was further decided 
not to distribute as dividends rather huge funds that the company had earned and to invest 
them back in the business.101 Mr. Henry Ford, the founder, controlling shareholder, and 
101
 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 170 N.W. 668, 683 (Mich. 1919) (hereinafter Dodge).
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dominant figure in the company, declared that his ambition was “to spread the benefits of this 
industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help [people] build up their lives and 
homes.”102 In 1919, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in a suit brought by the Dodge brothers 
as minority shareholders, clarified that it had “no doubt that certain sentiments, philanthropic 
and altruistic, credible to Mr. Ford, had large influence in determining the policy to be 
pursued by the Ford Motor Company…”103
The Dodge court was not impressed by these sentiments, however. In what has 
become a definitive exposition of shareholders’ status in the corporation for years to come the 
court said:
“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of 
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of profits among 
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”104
The proposition, that shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of the corporation and 
that, hence, fiduciary duties run to them, in conjunction with the corporation, is now widely 
accepted. This proposition is traditionally interpreted as calling on corporate fiduciaries to 
102 Id., id.
103 Id., at 684.
104 Dodge, supra note 101, at 684. The court held that it was the directors’ duty to distribute a very 
large sum of money to stockholders. It therefore affirmed the lower court’s decree to fix and determine a 
specific amount to be distributed to stockholders. Id., at 685. The company had to pay about $19 million in 
dividends. In response to the court decision Mr. Ford bought out the holdings of all minority shareholders, 
including the Dodges. For further historical details about the early years of the Ford Motor Company and Henry 
Ford’s problematic personality, see Henry Ford And The Model T in DANIEL GROSS, FORBES® GREATEST 
BUSINESS STORIES OF ALL TIME (1996), also available on-line at 
http://www.wiley.com/legacy/products/subject/business/forbes/ford.html.
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maximize shareholder value.105 It is often referred to by shorthand as the “shareholder 
primacy norm” or the “shareholder wealth maximization norm.” While being widely cited 
and compelling in its rhetoric, the ruling in Dodge only marks the beginning of the 
discussion. It does not reflect current legal doctrines in the U.S. nor does it fully comport 
with subsequent theoretical analyses.
Strictly speaking, in terms of the black-letter law concerning the maximands of 
corporate governance, only a few courts have read Dodge as saying what countless law 
review articles have cited it as saying. In Delaware, both the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Chancery cited this case as demonstrating a possible relief to minority shareholders who are 
oppressed by the controlling shareholder or management through withholding of 
dividends.106 The courts of Michigan, where Dodge originated, also consider Dodge a 
standard case of management discretion.107 One Michigan court in fact noted that Dodge was 
not a case of action against shareholders’ interests.108
105 See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 97 (1995) (Corporate law 
scholars "generally agree… that management's principal fiduciary duty is to maximize the return to the common 
shareholders...."); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 32 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998) 
(“Corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to make decisions that are in the best interests of the shareholders .”)
106 See Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 163 A.2d 288, 295 (Del. 1960) (Delaware Supreme 
Court; citing Dodge for the proposition that “[i]f the plaintiffs are able to establish as the fact that money is 
available in the corporations which should be paid out in dividends, and that the management willfully refuses 
to do so in order to freeze out the minority interest, then upon such a showing the extraordinary relief of a 
direction to management to declare and pay a dividend might become available to them.”); Blackwell v. Nixon, 
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150 (“[I]f this were merely a dividend case, they would have to establish that the directors 
set dividends at an amount so low as to be oppressive, a gross abuse of discretion, or the product of bad faith. 
Few, if any, cases have involved a set of facts egregious enough to meet that standard. Cf. [Dodge]”).
107 See Lytle v. Malady, 566 N.W.2d 582, 593 (Mich. 1997) (citing Dodge for the proposition that 
courts should be reluctant to second-guess management in its day-to-day operations, e.g., with regard to 
payment of dividends).
108 See Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 761, 772 (Mich. 1977) (“Moreover, in the Dodge case the 
Court assumed that the expansion policy was in the best interest of the company and its shareholders, but 
concluded that it did not justify a withholding of dividends.”)
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Doubtless, reading Dodge as a minority rights case would be correct. In a thorough 
discussion of Dodge, D. Gordon Smith maintains that this is how the case should be 
understood.109 Smith correctly notes that the Dodge court emphasized Henry Ford’s position 
as a controlling stockholder in the sentence immediately preceding its statement of the 
shareholder primacy norm.110 Yet such reading clearly would also be partial – obscuring 
more than revealing. If Dodge had been merely a case of majority-minority relationships in 
the corporation it would not have gained the pride of place it has among the seminal 
authorities on U.S. corporate law.111
The strength of the ruling in Dodge and the explanation for its longevity both lie in its 
being paradigmatic of bona fide conflicts of interest among several corporate constituencies. 
There have been a number of more recent episodes in which interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies were invoked, e.g., with regard to anti-takeover statutes and court rulings on 
anti-takeover defense tactics.112 Yet none of these contexts exhibits the type of dilemma that 
Dodge poses with comparable clarity. In the former cases there often exists an overriding 
concern about insiders’ self-interest – a lingering suspicion that stakeholders only serve as a 
109
 D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277, 279 (1998) (“the 
shareholder primacy norm was first used by courts to resolve disputes among majority and minority 
shareholders in closely held corporations. Over time this use of the shareholder primacy norm has evolved into 
the modern doctrine of minority oppression. This application of the shareholder primacy norm seems 
incongruous today because minority oppression cases involve conflicts among shareholders, not conflicts 
between shareholders and nonshareholders.”)
110 Id., at 319.
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 It should be noted that in order to be considered a “seminal authority on U.S. corporate law”, as I 
claim that Dodge is, a case need not be uncontroversial nor does it have to reflect common legal practice. Quite 
the contrary. To become a seminal precedent a case has to address a core problem in a systematic way while 
being coherent with the general legal body to which it belongs. Prominent examples include the decisions in 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors’ duty of care) and Perlmann v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 
173 (1955) (sharing of control premium upon sale of control).
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 For a discussion, see below Section II.D.
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pretext or camouflage for incumbent managements that want to entrench themselves to the 
detriment of public shareholders. Dodge, in contrast, is free of this concern. The court 
believed that Henry Ford, in his capacity as the company’s dominant decision maker, was 
genuinely motivated by a desire to distribute the fruits of the company’s success to non-
shareholder constituencies.
B. The Berle-Dodd Dialogue
Dodge was a legal reflection of its political and economic era. Within a decade, 
America would slump into the Great Depression. The level of new car sales that was reached 
in the 1920s would be regained only in the late 1950s, after the New Deal and the Second 
World War. In the meanwhile, a seminal scholarly exchange had unfolded between two law 
professors, Adolf A. Berle of Columbia Law School and E. Merrick Dodd of Harvard Law 
School. Like the court’s statements in Dodge, the positions that were articulated in this 
dialogue remain definitive and continue to dominate current discussions. Understanding the 
original positions in this exchange is key to understanding contemporary positions as well. 
The following paragraphs therefore revisit Berle and Dodd with a view to identifying the 
historical intellectual roots of the maximands of corporate governance.
Berle fired the opening shot in a 1931 article titled Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust.113 “It is the thesis of this essay,” Berle stated, “that all powers granted to a corporation 
or to the management of a corporation… are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for 
the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.”114 At first blush, Berle’s 
113
 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) 
(hereinafter Powers in Trust).
114 Id, at 1049.
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claim reads like a restatement of Dodge. Yet it isn’t. Noting that “through the very nature of 
the corporate entity, responsibility goes with power,”115 Berle conducted a survey of powers 
granted under contemporary law either to corporations or to corporate officers and showed 
that all of them are governed by equitable fiduciary duties akin to those that are owed by 
trustees toward a cestui que trust. 
The central insight and the recurring theme in Berle’s article pertain to the content and 
legal nature of the fiduciary duties – not to the identity of the beneficiaries thereof (i.e., the 
accountees in the accountability relationship). To be sure, Berle did cite Dodge. But this 
decision is brought as supporting authority only to the proposition that the “power to declare 
or withhold dividends must be so used as to tend to the benefit not only of the corporation as 
a whole but also of all of its shareholders to the extent that this is possible.”116 In other words, 
the issue at bar was the relationship between majority and minority shareholders rather than 
between shareholders and other constituencies as competing accountees.117
It was actually Dodd who defined the debate over the maximands of corporate 
governance as we know it. In his 1932 article For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?,118 Dodd turned the limelight on the beneficiaries of managers’ duties and away 
from the legal nature of these duties, agreeing with Berle on the latter issue, namely, that the 
115 Id, at 1050.
116 Id, at 1060.
117
 When Berle mentions the “general good of the community”, id, at 1961, he does so to indicate 
Henry Ford’s personal whims as a controlling shareholder. In a similar vein, Berle, id., id., cites Channon v. 
Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397 (1920) as an example of a case where a majority shareholder was directed to 
declare dividends after he, as the father of the family, withheld them because he thought that other shareholders 
who were members of the family needed discipline.
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 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 
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trusteeship principle should apply to such duties.119 Citing Dodge, Dodd acknowledged that 
legal doctrine of his time considered the sole function of the corporation to be the making of 
profit for its stockholders such that they are the beneficiaries of the business and the people 
who carry it on.120 Dodd nevertheless believed that this situation was undesirable. Writing in 
the midst of great economic and social upheaval in America, Dodd appears to have been 
deeply moved by the Depression and the budding New Deal.121 In the reformed economy, he 
prophesied, there would be “modifications of the maximum-profit-for-the-stockholders-of-
the-individual-company formula.”122
A close reading of Dodd makes it abundantly clear that his prediction, that managers 
will come to consider the interests of employees, consumers, and the general public in 
addition to stockholder’s interests, was never more than wishful thinking. Support for Dodd’s 
belief that the American society was heading in this direction is found in opinions made by a 
few prominent figures in the business community of the time.123 Dodd interpreted these 
sporadic statements as harbingers of an emerging, more general trend in American society 
toward greater concern for non-stockholder constituencies. 
119
 Dodd writes: “The present author is thoroughly in sympathy with Mr. Berle’s efforts to establish a 
legal control which will more effectively prevent corporate managers for diverting profit into their own pockets 
from those of stockholders, and agrees with many of the specific rules which latter deduces from his trusteeship 
principle.” Id., at 1147.
120 Id., at 1146. However, Dodd stresses that neither the language of the opinion nor the relief granted 
necessarily involves an unqualified acceptance of the maximum-profit-for-stockholders formula. Id, at 1158n31.
121
 Dodd makes references to “the present time,” “recent economic events,” “contemporary discussion 
of the need for planned economic order,” and so forth. See, respectively, id., at 1148, 1151, 1152.
122 Id., at 1151.
123
 Dodd cites extensively from an address by Owen D. Young, an executive officer of the General 
Electric Company (GE) and formerly a practicing lawyer, from GE’s President Swope, and from Dean Donham 
of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. Id., at 1154-56.
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Yet beside Dodd’s unmistaken enthusiasm about these statements, he was quite 
inconsistent as to why such trend would likely succeed. Dodd cites the view that taking 
employees and consumers into account will increase stockholders’ long-run profits (namely, 
efficiency concerns); but he also asserts that managers who have power over the lives of 
others will “come to feel as strong a community of interest with their fellow workers as with 
a group of investors” (namely, ethical concerns).124 At bottom, the justification for taking 
other constituencies into account depends on the recognition of corporations as public 
entities, rather than private property of their stockholders. At the same time, such recognition 
is a necessary condition for including other constituencies in managers’ considerations.
Just as Dodd never challenged Berle’s original argument, so did Berle, in his response 
to Dodd’s article,125 not really dispute the latter’s theoretical position.126 Nevertheless, Berle 
literally lashed out at Dodd for making a fallacious move from the normative to the 
descriptive. Desirable as it may be as a matter of theory, social responsibility was not in fact 
pursued by corporations and corporate insiders. Nor could it be pursued. This implementation 
problem, Berle believed, is insurmountable, as there is no mechanism that could enforce 
social responsibility on corporations.127
The conclusion, averred Berle, is grim but inevitable:
124 Id., at 1156-57.
125
 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 
(1932) (hereinafter Note).
126 Id., at 1366 (“As a matter of economics and social theory, Professor Dodd’s argument is not only 
sound but familiar”).
127 Id., id. (“This is the real justification for Professor Dodd’s argument. But it is theory, not practice. 
The industrial “control” does not now think of himself as a prince; he does not now assume responsibilities to 
the community; his bankers do not now undertake to recognize social claims; his lawyers do not advise him in 
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“Now I submit that you can not [sic] abandon emphasis on ‘the view that business 
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their shareholders’ until such 
time as are to be prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of 
responsibilities to someone else.”128
When Berle was exchanging with Dodd, he was already engulfed in his collaborative 
study with Gardiner Means that would yield their seminal book The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property.129 In this book, Berle and Means empirically documented the actual 
separation between American shareholders’ ownership of corporate stocks on the one hand 
and control over Corporate America on the other hand. The result was effective control 
residing in the hands of managers, who used it to benefit themselves and controlling 
shareholders. Berle and Means called for conceiving corporations as public again. They wrote 
that “by surrendering control and responsibility over the active property, [shareholders] have 
surrendered the right that the corporation be operated in their sole interest. . . .  They have 
placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone 
the owners or the control but all society.”130
Berle and Means’ position looks strikingly similar to Dodd’s position, which Berle so 
forcefully criticized in his note of the same year. Several commentators have thus been 
puzzled by Berle’s position. William Bratton, in an appraisal of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property at the turn of the millenium, points out this apparent inconsistency and 
terms of social responsibility. Nor is there any mechanism now in sight enforcing accomplishments of [Dodd’s] 
theoretical function.”)
128 Id., at 1367.
129 ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1932).
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writes that “Berle appears to have been of two minds on the matter.”131 Several decades 
earlier, Joseph Weiner also argued that Berle was offering contradictory resolutions of the 
corporate governance problem and was in fact changing positions on managerial 
accountability to shareholders or community.132
Although Bratton is willing to forgive Berle for this inconsistency,133 I would argue 
that no such forgiveness is called for, as there is no incoherence in Berle’s writings.134 In 
writing his note on Dodd and his book with Means, Berle was fully aware of the need to 
protect both stockholders and stakeholders from those in positions of power over their 
interests – the constituency that Berle and Means dubbed “control.” The bulk of Berle and 
Means’ opus is dedicated to a positive analysis of the separation between ownership and 
control in American corporations. Their normative analysis is mostly confined to a small 
number of pages in the closing chapter.135 More than seventy years after its publication, this 
chapter’s policy analysis remains as fresh and compelling as ever.
130 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 129 at 355-56.
131
 William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 
737, 761 (2001).
132
 Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1458 (1964); see also Wilber G. Katz, Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J. L. & ECON. 75 
(1960).
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 Bratton, supra note 131, at 761-762 (“Berle also can be forgiven this inconsistency. His indecision 
reflects the ambivalence displayed in corporate law commentary ever since. The public-regarding approach 
persists as a minority view. Each generation raises anew the same questions about corporate accountability 
because corporations continue to bear importantly on our social and political lives, and external regulation can 
never bring corporate results and perceived social goals into congruence. At the same time, no advocate of 
enhanced responsibility has ever successfully confronted and disposed of the counterargument Berle made in the 
debate with Dodd.”) (footnotes omitted).
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 As a technical matter, one may note that The Modern Corporation and Private Property is 
repeatedly cited in Berle’s article. See Berle, Note, supra note 125, at 1366n4, 1367n7, 1369n9.
135 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 129 at 352-57. The very limited scope dedicated to normative analysis 
may be explained by the fact that the writing of The Modern Corporation and Private Property was 
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Having established the factual separation of ownership from control and the 
concomitant concentration of power in the hands of “control,” Berle and Means set out to 
outline different ways in which this power could be regulated in capitalist countries in the 
future.136 Two possible ways are the more traditional ones: The first way is to provide legal 
protection to public shareholders through the trusteeship model.137 The second way is to give 
the groups in control powers which are absolute and not limited by any implied obligation 
with respect to the their use.138 Of these two alternatives, the former is said to be the lesser of 
two evils.139 Berle and Means did not stop there, however. They point out a third possibility –
the one cited above, under which the “control groups have, rather, cleared the way for the 
claims of a groups far wider that either the owners or the control,” to wit, all society.140
Should this “third way” be implemented, Berle and Means claimed, in contrast to the ruling 
in Dodge, courts would approve of managerial programs that benefited employees and 
communities at the expense of shareholders and bondholders.141
commissioned and financed by grant from the Social Science Research Council of America. For a 
historiography of this project, see Bratton, supra note 131.
136 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 129 at 353-54 (“How will this demand [for regulation of power in 
corporations] be made effective? To answer this question would be to foresee the history of the next century.”)
137 Id., at 354. This strategy is described in more detail in an earlier chapter titled Corporate Powers as 
Powers in Trust, id., at 247-276, which draws on Berle’s article of the same title. Berle, Powers in Trust, supra
note 113.
138 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 129, at 354.
139 Id., at 355.
140 Id, at 355-56.
141 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 129 at 355 (“Should the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a 
program comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of 
business, all of which would divert a portion of the profits from the owners of passive property, and should the 
community generally accept such a scheme as a logical and human solution of industrial difficulties, the 
interests of passive property owners would have to give way. Courts would almost of necessity be forced to 
recognize the result, justifying it by whatever of the many legal theories they might choose.”)
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In contrast with Dodd, however, Berle (writing both alone and with Means) was fully 
aware that such a social arrangement would entail formidable implementation problems. 
Berle and Means do not hide their preference for this “third way.” Yet they are very careful to 
note that it would require specifying the claims of the community “with clarity and force.” 
Only “[w]hen a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally 
accepted, the passive property rights of today must yield before the larger interests of 
society.”142 Until such system is devised, and since effective legal protection of all 
stakeholders is infeasible (at least at the time) the law should concentrate on protecting 
stockholders through the accountability mechanism of trusteeship.143 The interests of non-
stockholder constituencies may receive protection through other means.144
The dialogue between Berle and Dodd largely subsided after 1932 but did not fully 
end. In a review of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Dodd conceded that 
142 Id., at 356.
143 See id., id (“Choice between strengthening the rights of passive property owners, or leaving a set of 
uncurbed powers in the hands of control therefore resolves itself into a purely realistic evaluation of different 
results. We might elect the relative certainty and safety of a trust relationship in favor of a particular group 
within the corporation, accompanied by a possible diminution of enterprise. Or, we may grant the controlling 
group free rein, with the corresponding danger of a corporate oligarchy coupled with the probability of an era of 
corporate plundering.”); Berle, supra note 125, at 1371-72 (“The shareholder who now has a primary property 
over residual income after expenses are met, may ultimately be conceived as having an equal participation with 
a number of other claimants…But it is one thing to say that the law must allow for such developments. It is 
quite another to grant uncontrolled power to corporate managers in the hope that they will produce that 
development… Meanwhile, as lawyers, we had best be protecting the interests we know, being no less swift to 
provide for the new interests as they successively appear.”)
144
 Increased government regulation could serve such purpose. Whether regulation can be relied on to 
deliver effective protection to stakeholders is beyond the scope of this study. See Amir N. Licht, International 
Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 159 
(1998) (arguing that the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 defused the debate over the nature of the corporation 
as a public or private entity). Whatever position one may hold about the role of regulation, it cannot affect the 
insight that establishing legal fiduciary duties to several constituencies faces serious implementation problems.
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regulation of management conduct would require strong legal measures.145 However, in 
another lesser-known article,146 Dodd seems to have tried to deflect Berle’s arguments using 
reasoning somewhat similar to Berle’s. Dodd too noted that the major problem for social 
regulation of corporate managements had to do with implementation. Legal enforcement 
alone, he argued, cannot ensure managements’ loyalty to stockholders if the legal rules are 
not in congruence with their professional ethics and, more generally, with socially-approved 
goals.147 In this respect, advancing the interests of employees, consumers, and the general
community appeared to Dodd to be “less abnormal” than shareholder value maximization.148
Dodd, however, failed to furnish any new evidence that could support his belief, that 
trusteeship for absentee investors “is an ideal that is losing ground in the community 
generally.”149
Oddly, twenty years after their dialogue unfolded, Berle stated that events had settled 
the argument in Dodd’s favor.
145
 E. Merrick Dodd, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 782, 785 
(1933) (“If corporations generally are to be conducted in such manner as to give due regard to the interests of all 
classes in society, including wage earners and consumers as well as investors and management, it is primarily 
through legislation that the change can be brought about.”)
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 E. Merrick Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers 
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147 Id., at 199, 202 (“the endeavor to write that ideal [of stockholder profit maximization] into law 
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L. REV. (2001).
148 Id., at 203 (“Service to one’s fellow workers, to those who have need of one’s products, or the social 
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149 Id., at 207. Dodd, id, at 206, only repeats the references made in Dodd, supra note 118.
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“Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E. Merrick 
Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate powers were powers in trust 
for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that these powers were held in trust for the 
entire community.  The argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in 
favor of Professor Dodd's contention.”150
The immediate reason that led Berle to concede defeat was the ruling in A.P. Smith 
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,151 in which a corporate donation to Princeton University was 
upheld. However, Berle later clarified that he did not intend to indicate that Dodd was “right 
all along.”152 Bearing in mind that the Barlow court cited long-term business interests among 
the justifications for the donation to Princeton153—a consideration that is fully in line with 
shareholders’ interest—it would seem that Berle was too modest. Berle’s late writings from 
the 1950s reflect a conviction that corporations should, as a normative matter, be engaged in 
promoting the interests of multiple constituencies.154 At the same time—much like Dodd of 
150 ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954), cited in A.A. Sommer, 
Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 33, 37n14 (1991); see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 BUS. 
LAW. 149, 150 (1968) (“Pragmatically, Professor Dodd won the debate. I was not convinced as a matter of 
doctrine that social responsibility should not be left to government but there was no doubt that the event 
conformed rather to his prediction than to mine.”)
151
 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
152
 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY xii (E. Mason ed. 1959),
cited in Sommer, supra note 150, id. (“It is one thing to agree that this is how social fact and judicial decisions 
turned out. It is another to admit this was the 'right' disposition; I am not convinced it was.”)
153
 98 A.2d at 590 (“[the donation] was voluntarily made in the reasonable belief that it would aid the 
public welfare and advance the interests of the plaintiff as a private corporation and as part of the community in 
which it operates.”)
154 BERLE, supra note 150, at 56 (“the modern American corporation understands well enough that it 
has a ‘constituency’ to deal with. If its constituents—notably its buyers—are unsatisfied, they will go to the 
political state for solution.”)
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the 1930s—Berle provided no practical details as to how exactly managers could bring about 
this utopian vision. Perhaps he never believed they could.155
Be it as it may, by the mid-1930s, legal doctrine and scholarship in the United States 
had developed a sophisticated account of the issues pertaining to the maximands of corporate 
governance. The most important achievement of these analyses is their pointing out the core 
problem, which is the absence of a coherent system with which the competing interests of 
corporate constituencies could be furthered—or at least reconciled—by corporate agents. 
This problem continues to haunt corporate governance analysis to this day.
C. From the 1950s to the 1970s
The period from the 1950 through the 1970s witnessed America undergoing several 
cycles of renewed interest in corporate social responsibility—the term that was coined to 
express promotion of interests of non-shareholder constituencies. These episodes are of lesser 
import for the purposes of the present study.156 After World War II and the Korean War, the 
United States was the single, unchallenged economic superpower in the world. Large 
American corporations were without equal foreign competitors in many markets. This sheer 
economic power—concentrated more than ever before in a small number of giant 
corporations—has drawn the attention of American commentators. During the 1950s, 
journalists, academics, and other critics (including Berle) were musing on the ways to harness 
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 Tellingly, Berle titled the fifth chapter of his joint book, supra note 150, Corporate Capitalism and 
the City of God.
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 These episodes are described in detail in a recent, skillful account by C.A. Harwell Wells, The 
Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 KAN. L. 
REV. 77 (2002), on which the following paragraphs draw.
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corporate power to socially desirable goals.157 Contemporary contributors identified the 
corporation as a problem, yet were unable to propose specific mechanisms to curb its power 
or direct it in socially beneficial directions.158 A critical voice came from Yale Law School 
Dean Eugene V. Rostow. In what reads like an early version of Jensen’s argument brought in 
the beginning of this article, Rostow said:
“The economist has demonstrated with all the apparent precision of plane geometry 
and the calculus that the quest for maximum revenue in a competitive market leads to a 
system of prices, and an allocation of resources and rewards, superior to any alternative, in its 
contribution to the economic welfare of the community as a whole.”159
The 1960s and 1970s brought new reasons for concern with corporate social 
responsibility. Attention was paid to a variety of social and political issues, at home and 
abroad, including the Vietnam War, civil rights and apartheid, consumer protection, and 
environmental issues. With giant corporations perceived as significant players in these issues 
(if not outright evil-doers), campaigns were consequently waged for shareholder proposal 
reform, public interest directors, and federal corporate chartering.160 These campaigns mostly 
157 See Wells, id., at 99-110.
158 Id., at 108.
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 Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE 
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 63 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1961), cited in Well, id., at 109.
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 Under a proposal advanced by Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman in RALPH NADER ET 
AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 125 (1976), the board would be composed entirely of outside 
“professional” directors, working full-time and provided with an independent staff to oversee the firm. Large 
corporations would be run by a board answerable simultaneously to shareholders, other constituencies, and the 
general public, with one director specially responsible for employee welfare, another for consumer protection, 
another for community relations, and so on. As Wells pointedly notes, id., at 122-23, how exactly a director was 
supposed to fulfill simultaneous legal responsibilities to shareholders, the general public, and another 
constituency as well was not made clear.
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failed or had a negligible lasting effect.161 Indeed, the most memorable voice from that period 
is probably Milton Friedman’s in his article The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits.162 In this article, Friedman argued against using corporate resources to 
promote social goals or moral values in ways not required by law or ethical custom.163
Friedman remained silent about the content and scope of that “ethical custom” which would 
legitimate diversion of resources away from maximizing profits. Yet it is clear that such 
ethical considerations would be extremely narrow.164
In terms of positive law too, little changed in the direction of eroding shareholder 
primacy. Barlow exemplifies a general trend of state legislators to allow corporations to make 
charitable contributions but did not seriously challenge shareholder primacy. The famous 
1968 decision in Shlensky v. Wrigley,165 upholding the directors’ decision not to install lights 
in Wrigley Field despite the loss of potential profits, similarly noted that “the long run 
For additional calls in a similar spirit see, generally, ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 
AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY (Rev. ed. 1990); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL 
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).
161 See Wells, id., at 111-23.
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 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine - The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, 6 (Magazine), at 32 (hereinafter Social Responsibility). 
163 Id., at 33 (“[A] corporate executive.... has direct responsibility to his employers.... That 
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as 
much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and 
those embodied  in ethical custom.”). See also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-36 (1962) 
(presenting similar views).
164
 According to Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 162, at 33, “social goals” that do not
warrant departure from profit maximization include providing employment, eliminating discrimination, 
reducing pollution, preventing inflation, and fighting poverty.
165
 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. 1968).
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interests of the corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to 
keep the neighborhood from deteriorating.”166
D. Other-Constituency Statutes
The controversy over the appropriate maximands of corporate governance erupted in 
earnest again during the 1980s. This was largely in consequence to the tidal wave of hostile 
takeovers and states’ response in the form of “other constituency statutes.” The title “other 
constituency statutes” subsumes a variety of state legislative measures intended to expand the 
scope of discretion of public corporations’ managements such that it would include the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies.167 These statutes have engendered numerous legal 
commentaries,168 but, fortunately, this sizeable literature need not engage us here for too 
long.
166
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O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect 
Displaced Workers, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1189 (1991); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 
STETSON L. REV. 121 (1991); Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency 
Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971 (1992); Eric W. Orts, Beyond 
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992); Ronn S. 
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, corporate charter amendments were adopted by a 
few corporations allowing directors, should their corporation become subject to a change of 
control, to consider the social and economic effects of the acquisition on the target’s 
employees, suppliers, customers, and others.169 The paradigmatic takeover that ostensibly 
dominated public perception at the time was the hostile “bust-up” takeover, in which the new 
controlling shareholder not only ousts the incumbent management but actually liquidates the 
firm’s assets, fires most or all of its employees, and severely disrupts the way of life of small 
communities, especially in one-factory towns.170
In 1983, Pennsylvania adopted the first other-constituency statute.171 This statute 
served as a model for several other states.172 Today, twenty-nine states have statutes that 
permit, or in one instance requires, the directors and officers of corporations chartered within 
their states to consider the interests of the standard other constituencies beyond the 
corporations’ shareholders, at least in certain situations (particularly in connection with a 
Davids, Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for Addressing Transition Costs?, 28 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 145 (1995); Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency 
Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (1998).
169
 Orts, supra note 167, at 20.
170
 This public image was intensified with the development of a colorful jargon to describe takeover 
activity – a jargon that referred to raiders, white knights, poison pills, shark repellants, greenmail, etc. For a 
glimpse into that period’s atmosphere, see, e.g., Anne B. Fisher, Oops! My Company is on the Block, FORTUNE, 
July 23, 1984, at p. 16; Who Can Stop the Raiders of Corporate America?, ECONOMIST, April 7, 1984, Vol. 291, 
at 77.
171
 The statute provided that 
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, committees of the 
board, individual directors and individual officers may, in considering the best interests of the 
corporation, consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers and customers of the 
corporation, communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located, and 
all other pertinent factors. 
Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No. 1983-92, § 1(B), 1983 Pa. Laws 395, cited in Orts, supra note 167, at 27.
172
 Orts, supra note 167, at 27. For a list of states with other constituency statutes, see Wai Shun 
Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-
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change of control).173 Delaware never adopted a constituency statute of this type. The 
Delaware Supreme Court, in its 1985 decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
nevertheless stated that in analyzing the effect of an imminent takeover on the “corporate 
enterprise”, the directors may consider its “impact on constituencies other than shareholders 
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)…”174
Courts in other jurisdictions followed suit and approved of considering the interests of other 
constituencies.175 The courts did that while emphasizing that such consideration cannot be 
made unless benefits to shareholders can be identified, thus echoing earlier decisions 
mentioned above.176 In summary, the other constituency statutes are generally interpreted as 
having made hardly any change in American corporate law.177
Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 613, 620 (1997). For the relevant text of most of the 
statutes, see Stetson Symposium, supra note 168, at 279-93. 
173 See Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes 
Under the Takings Clause, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 4-6 (1998) (providing a survey of current statues). The 
Connecticut statute applies in change-of-control situations, and provides that the directors “shall consider, in 
determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,… the interests of the 
corporation's employees, customers, creditors, and suppliers," as well as "community and societal 
considerations.” Conn. Gen. Stat. 33-756(d) (2003).
174
 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
175 See GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“protection 
of loyal employees, including managers, of the organization is not anathema…legitimate concerns for their past 
conduct of the enterprise and its requirements need not be left to the goodwill of an unfriendly acquirer of 
corporate control in the jungle warfare involving attempted takeovers”); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal 
Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009, 1015 (E.D. Wis. 1989), aff'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
176 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (the 
“board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided that there are 
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 
1261, 1282, 1285 (Del. 1989) (respectively, the board may consider “the impact of both the bid and the potential 
acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder 
interests.”; “an offer [can] be rebuffed, given...the alternatives available and their effect on the various 
constituencies, particularly the stockholders.”); see also E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform 
Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices - or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184 (2001) 
(“Delaware's jurisprudence holds that the interests of stockholders are primary and may not be trumped by that 
of other constituencies, although those interests may be considered if congruent with the interests of the 
stockholders.”).
177
 In 1990, the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar 
Association (“ALI-ABA”), as part of the preparation of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (the 
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It has been noted that these statutes have received only cursory attention from the
courts,178 and have played a negligible part, if any, in litigation over directors’ decisions.179
The reason, I argue, is twofold. First, advancing the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies probably never was the primary reason for the enactment of the other 
constituency statutes. These statutes should be assessed in light of their typical legislative 
history, according to which they were enacted in response to hostile takeovers and were 
lobbied for mostly by managements of potential target firms.180 Seen in this light, these 
statues belong to a larger arsenal of anti-takeover defenses that were developed and deployed 
to help incumbent managements entrench themselves.181 The legal technology for thwarting 
management-unfriendly takeovers has progressed since the mid- 1980s such that today it 
relies on other means.182 Moreover, once the consideration of other constituencies’ interest 
"Model Act"), reviewed the other constituency statutes. The Committee has concluded that the Model Act 
should not be amended in light of these statutes. The Committee opined, however, that other constituency 
statutes may create “opportunities for misunderstanding and thus pose potential for mischief unless the courts 
carefully construe them consistently with existing law.” See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other 
Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2254-55, 2257-61 (1990). 
178 See Orts, supra note 167, at 23-35 (analyzing court opinions); Oswald, supra note 173, at 7n37 
(same).
179 See Oswald, supra note 173, at 7 (“Judicial interpretation of the constituency statutes to date has 
been sparse and uninformative, invariably referring to the constituency statutes in only a fleeting and tangential 
manner. No court has yet provided an analysis of the legality or constitutionality of constituency statutes, or 
even an explanation of how they should be implemented in specific contexts.”)
180
 Orts, supra note 167, at 24. For instance, the Pennsylvania statute was enacted at the behest of the 
state Chamber of Commerce at a time when two local companies, Scott Paper Company and Gulf Oil, were 
facing control battles. Orts, id. Orts notes, however, that a few statutes were also backed by labor unions –  a 
fact that underscores their consistency with employees’ interest. This point should distract one from the 
argument made in the text. The language of these statues – in principle and perhaps also in practice – benefits 
employees. Yet the motivation for their enactment came from managements.
181 See Thomas W. Dunfee, Challenges to Corporate Governance: Corporate Governance in a Market 
with Morality, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 129, 136 (1999) (arguing that this heritage of other constituency 
statutes taints their status as legitimizing a multi-stakeholder approach to corporate governance.)
182
 A general discussion of anti-takeover techniques is beyond the scope of the present study. For a 
review and analysis, see, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the 
Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301 (2001); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan 
Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. 
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was brought within the ambit of legitimate managerial discretion—namely, within the ambit 
of the business judgment rule—chances became slim that parties would litigate over such 
consideration, similar to other “just say no” anti-takeover defenses.183
The second explanation for the low impact that the other constituency statutes have 
had on American corporate law brings us back to the subject of this paper. Beyond merely 
mentioning the interests of the regular constituencies—often with the reservation that they 
should be in line with long-term shareholder interests—these statutes did not provide much 
guidance as to how these apparently conflicting interests should be reconciled. When could 
employees’ interests take precedence over shareholders’ interests? Must the benefit accruing 
to employees be larger than the loss visited on shareholders? How should this calculus be 
done – per constituency, per capita, per relative investment? Stated otherwise, these statutes 
raised the very implementation problem that Berle was so keenly aware of – the problem that 
caused him to abandon his City-of-God principle184 of managers’ trusteeship to multiple 
stakeholder for a second-best duty to shareholders. To use Berle and Means’ words, what was 
(and remains) lacking is a “convincing system of community obligations” that is framed 
L. REV. 887 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 885 (2002).
183
 For a retrospective review of the take-over wave and anti-takeover defenses (particularly the poison 
pill), see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive 
Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 873-88 (2002); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case 
Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 1021-26 (2002).
184 See supra note 155.
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“with clarity and force.”185 Neither the courts nor academic commentators have succeeded in 
devising such a system.186
E. Contemporary Analyses and Their Limits
The debate over other constituency statutes in the late 1980s and early 1990s also 
rekindled the more general discussion on the maximands of corporate governance and the 
appropriate beneficiaries of managers’ fiduciary duties. This Section maps these approaches 
and identifies their relative strengths and weaknesses. 
1. Traditional Economic Analysis
The traditional law and economics approach to the maximands issue holds, simply, 
that the shareholder-value-maximization rule is (1) efficient and (2) workable. Respectively, 
a multiple-constituency rule is said to be inefficient and unworkable. This line of analysis is 
represented in its the purest form by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel’s 1991 book 
summarizing their work on corporate law.187 In line with their general contractual view of the 
185 See supra text to note 142. 
186
  The final version of the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance similarly reflects the vague rule 
that directors are allowed to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies. The general rule provides 
that “a corporation...should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing 
corporate profit and shareholder gain.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1994). Nevertheless, corporations may pursue non-profit-
enhancing objectives in three conditions: (1) such action is required for staying within the boundaries of the law; 
(2) such action is taken in light of ethical considerations appropriate to responsible conduct of business; (3) a 
reasonable amount of resources may be dedicated to charitable causes. Id. § 2.01(b). The Principles also include 
a rule covering the specific context of corporate behavior in the face of a hostile takeover bit, id., at § 6.02, 
which reflects the case law described above. That these Principles are vague and leave ample room for reaching 
different decisions can hardly be denied. Section 2.01(b)(2) in particular imports into corporate decision-making 
processes a host of potential considerations that are bound to be controversial and subject to political
inclinations.
187 EASTERBOROOK & FISCHEL¸ supra note 4. 
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corporation,188 Easterbrook and Fischel also address the issue of the maximands of corporate 
governance. The pivotal element in this analysis is the notion of “residual claimant,” namely, 
the party (constituency) who is entitled to derive benefits from an enterprise only after all 
other claims have been satisfied. Easterbrook and Fischel equate this constituency with 
shareholders. Shareholders are the only constituency whose interest is risky and is determined 
ex post factum. All other constituencies—including creditors and employees—have fixed 
claims whose value is known in advance, at least in expectancy, or no (valid) claim at all.189
Under this analysis, shareholder wealth maximization is the desirable rule because it 
takes advantage of the firm’s strength due to its tendency to maximize wealth in general. 
Easterbrook and Fischel set aside other social goals such as addressing pollution, bribery, and 
plant closing, for two reasons:
“One reason is obvious: a manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity 
holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither… 
Agency costs rise and social wealth falls. 
188
 The view of the corporation as a contractual arrangement—or a “nexus of contracts”—raises prickly 
questions that are beside the goal of this paper. The nexus metaphor is attributed to Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976) and Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). For a critical analysis, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the 
Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 819 (1999); see also Jeffrey Nesteruk, Persons, 
Property, and the Corporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 543 (1990); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic 
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992).
189 EASTERBOROOK & FISCHEL¸ supra note 4, at 36 (“For most firms the expectation is that the residual 
risk bearers have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the 
value of their stock. Other participants contract for fixed payouts—monthly interest, salaries, pensions, 
severance payments, and the like… Risk bearers get a residual claim to profit; those who do not bear risk on the 
margin get fixed terms of trade.”)
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Another reason is no less important but more often missed: maximizing profits for 
equity investors assists the other “constituencies” automatically… In a market economy each 
party to a transaction is better off.”190
Thus, the justifications for determining shareholders’ interest as the single maximand 
of corporate governance are both theoretical and practical. The shareholder-wealth-
maximization rule arguably increases social wealth and is therefore efficient in comparison to 
the alternative rule that decreases wealth. This is the traditional argument of the rising-tide-
lifts-all-boats type—an alleged “win-win situation.”191 It explicitly ignores other social 
issues. Indeed, Easterbrook and Fischel deny that such issues have to do with corporate 
governance.192 Other scholars have joined Easterbrook and Fischel’s camp of those endorsing 
shareholder value as the proper maximand relying on a variety of arguments.193 What is 
190 Id., at 38.
191
 For similar articulations of this argument see Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“The utilitarian justification [for the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm] is that… in the long run, the argument goes, employees and other 
stakeholders are overall better off with fluid and efficient capital markets, managers need a simple metric to 
follow, and both wealth and, in the end, fairness are maximized by shareholders being the corporation's residual 
beneficiary, with the other claimants getting what they want via contract with the corporation.”); Allen, supra
note 188, at 269-70 (same).
192 Id., at 39 (“To view pollution, or investment in South Africa, or other difficult moral and social 
questions as governance is to miss the point”) (emphasis in the original). Many commentators may object to this 
classification of issues as related or unrelated to corporate governance. Scholars from the progressive corporate 
law movement, mentioned in the text below, surely would make such objections. However, writers not 
identified with this group also include a broader set of issues in “corporate governance.” See, e.g., Dyck & 
Zingales, supra note 95 (discussing the role of the media in pressuring corporate managers and directors to 
behave in ways that are “socially acceptable”, mostly with regard to environmental issues, and sometimes not in 
line with shareholders’ value maximization.)
193 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1984); 
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive 
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1993); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, In Defense of Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1996); Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate 
Constituency Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (1998); Alan J. Meese, The Team 
Production Theory Of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002). 
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common to this group is the assumption that shareholder primacy leads to efficient outcomes 
because it requires corporate decision makers to maximize the corporate residual claim and, 
consequently, the entire corporate pie and general social welfare.
The practical reason for preferring shareholder value as a unique maximand is that 
this is a workable rule, or, more accurately, that the alternative multiple-constituency rule 
would be unworkable. As economist Oliver Hart has put it, calling on management to take 
the interests of all constituencies into account “is essentially vacuous, because it allows 
management to justify almost any action on the grounds that it benefits some group.”194
2. Incomplete Contracts and Power
The traditional economic analysis case for shareholder primacy as it is described 
above is susceptible to a number of criticisms. These criticisms challenge different aspects of 
the traditional case but on the whole they tend to undermine the claim that shareholder 
primacy is an efficient rule. The central critique of this claim attacks the pivotal distinction 
between fixed and residual claims on the corporation. Consider the corporation’s creditors. In 
theory, no claim on the firm can be more fixed then those stipulated in a loan agreement, a 
debenture, and the like. Courts have indeed underscored the fact, that bondholder protection 
is determined only by the language of the indenture. Bondholders were thus denied any 
further vague and open-ended protection under a duty of loyalty paradigm.195 In light of this 
194
 Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duties, 43 U. TORONTO. L.J. 299, 303 (1993).
195 See Simons v. Cogan 542 A. 2d 785, 785-791 (1987) (hereinafter Simons); see also William B. 
Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 WISC. L. REV. 667, 668 (1984) (“Courts 
traditionally have directed bondholders to protect themselves against… self-interested issuer action with explicit 
contractual provisions. Holders of senior securities, such as bonds, are outside the legal model of the firm for 
protective purposes: a heavy black-letter line bars the extension of corporate fiduciary protections to them.”)
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legal situation it is no wonder that the legal profession has perfected the art of indenture 
drafting and developed a comprehensive set of contractual covenants intended to protect 
creditors in various contingencies.196
This seeming perfectness is misleading, however. Developments in the economic 
theory of contracts especially since the late 1980s have highlighted the problem of 
incomplete contracts.197 In contrast to what some scholars and courts may have believed in 
the past, commercial relationships between corporations and their creditors can never be 
“exhaustively documented” in a contract.198 The complete contingent contract—namely, the 
contract that defines the parties’ rights and entitlements in every future contingency—is 
impossible to achieve. 
In reality, parties are unable to foresee all future states of the world such that surprises 
are bound to occur. Even if all future contingencies were foreseeable the cost of spelling them 
out, negotiating for an agreed outcome, and putting down the agreement in writing would be 
prohibitive. At times, a party may even wish to exploit an informational advantage it has over 
the other party if it would not be actionable in court and abstain from pointing out certain 
196
 The Simons court, at 542 A. 2d 791, thus referred to the “highly negotiated and exhaustively 
documented commercial relationship between an issuer of convertible securities and the holders of such 
securities”. For a classic survey, see Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An 
Analysis of Bond Covenants 17 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
197 See, generally, OLIVER HART, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); for further economic 
analyses, see Sharon Gifford, Limited Attention and the Optimal Incompleteness of Contracts, 15 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 468 (1999); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992); 
Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, Income Fluctuations and Asymmetric Information, 51 J. ECON.THEORY 367 
(1991); Douglas B. Bernheim & Michael Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. 
ECON. REV. 432 (1998); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 
ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 119 (1988); Gur Huberman & Charles M. Kahn, Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic 
Renegotiation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 471 (1988).
198 Cf. the court’s statement in Simons, supra note 196.
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contingencies. Parties may fail to contract on certain contingencies if such contracting would 
be futile. Such will be the case when it is impossible or prohibitively costly to monitor the 
other party (the problem of unobservability); or, even when a breach could be detected, the 
injured party would be unable to prove it to a third party, e.g., a judge (the problem of 
unverifiability). 
These aspects of incomplete contracts link the issue of corporate governance 
maximands to the agency problem. The myriad reasons for impossibility of complete 
contingent contracts suggest that in many cases, the rights and entitlements of the parties 
would be indeterminate. Situations in which one party (the agent) has the ability unilaterally 
to affect the interest of the other party (the principal) are likely to be ubiquitous. One may say 
that in such situations the former has power over the latter in the Hohfeldian meaning of this 
term.199
Let us now return to the corporation’s creditors. The logic behind the Simons doctrine, 
under which creditors are protected only by contractual covenants, holds when the firm is 
solvent and the parties can assess, and price, the likelihood of default. As the firm nears 
financial distress, shareholders—as the beneficiaries of corporate officers’ fiduciary duties—
have an interest that the firm will take excessive risk. Should the contingency of business 
199
 In the 1910s, Wesley Hohfeld advanced an elegant diagrammatic model of dyadic relationships 
between legal statuses that included a dyadic relationship between power and liability. Wesley N. Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (hereinafter 
Hohfeld 1913); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 
YALE L.J. 710 (1917). According to Hohfeld, “[the] person (or persons) whose volitional control is paramount 
may be said to have the (legal) power to affect the particular change of legal relations that is involved in the 
problem.” Hohfeld 1913, id., at 44. Liability is simply a correlative concept of power, denoting the status of the 
other party as subject to the first party’s power. Hohfeld later consolidated his model in WESLEY N. HOHFELD, 
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING, (W.W. Cook, ed. 1919; reprint 
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failure materialize the loss will be visited on the creditors; but shareholders will reap all the 
gains (net of financing costs) should the firm succeed. One can therefore say that in such 
cases, shareholders have power vis-à-vis creditors. 
Acknowledging the nature of this relationship as one of power, the courts of Delaware 
voiced guarded willingness to recognize an exception to the Simons doctrine. In Credit 
Lyonnais,200 Chancellor Allen stated in an obiter dictum that when a corporation is in severe 
financial distress, corporate fiduciaries owe their fiduciary obligation to the “corporate 
enterprise” rather than to shareholders or any single constituency. “At least where a 
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the 
agent of the residue [sic] risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”201 In a 
situation like this, management may need to harm shareholder value by accepting fire-sale 
prices for corporate assets.202 This is because the “board or its executive committee [has] an 
obligation to the community of interest that sustained the corporation.”203
Credit Lyonnais and its progeny204 thus go explicitly against the traditional economic 
analysis injunction, that shareholder value, as it reflects the residual claim on the corporation, 
1964). For a general analysis of Hohfled’s framework, see ANDREW HALPIN, RIGHTS AND LAW: ANALYSIS AND 
THEORY (1997).
200
 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. CIV.A.12150, 1991 
WL 277613, at 34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); reprinted in William Allen, Unreported Case: Credit Lyonnais 
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099 (1992).
201




 In a later decision Chancellor Allen clarified the ruling in Credit Lyonnais while repeating the 
reference to multiple constituencies. See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 n. 2 
(Del. Ch. 1997) (“where foreseeable financial effects of a board decision may importantly fall upon creditors as 
well as holders of common stock, as where [the] corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency, an independent 
board may consider impacts upon all corporate constituencies in exercising its good faith business judgment for 
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should be the single appropriate maximand. When the indeterminacy of entitlements in the 
firm cannot be avoided, e.g., during severe financial distress, corporate decision makers205 are 
called to consider the interest of a nebulous “corporate enterprise” and give regard to its 
multiple constituencies.206
Like earlier calls for multiple-constituency fiduciary duties, the Credit Lyonnais
doctrine is susceptible to the critique that it is unworkable as it immediately raises the 
implementation problem identified by Berle. Once the residual-claim yardstick is rejected, 
corporate decision makers are left with no clear beacon with which they can navigate 
corporate affairs. Echoing Easterbrook and Fischel, Victor Brudney thus criticizes this line of 
court rulings, because the current board structure makes “the same persons arbiters for 
conflicting interests with accountability to none.”207 Brudney indeed opines that “it is hard to 
the benefit of the 'corporation.'”); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. 
Reliance Capital Group, Inc. (in re: Buckhead Am. Corp.) 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994) (board of directors 
of corporations operating in vicinity of insolvency owes duty to corporate enterprise); Miramar Resources, Inc. 
v. Schultz (In re Schultz), 208 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (same; applying the Credit Lyonnais 
decision).
205
 One may note anecdotally that somewhat like the situation in Dodge, in Credit Lyonnais these 
decision makers included both the majority shareholder and the board of directors.
206
 The “corporate enterprise” thus denotes something different, and arguably broader, than the firm 
itself as a legal personality. Readers should therefore not be misled by the fact that corporate fiduciaries are 
commonly said to owe their duties to the corporation. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., Del. Supr., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 
A.2d 503, 510 (1939). The real issue is which maximand fiduciaries should choose in fulfilling their obligations 
toward the corporation. 
207
 Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV 595, 645-46 
(1997). Brudney, id., thus proposes a reformed governance structure for properly considering the conflicting 
interests of all the constituencies involved:
“[I]t may be necessary and appropriate for the corporate decision-making body (the board and 
management) to reconcile the interests of the competing claims of stockholders and creditors (and other 
stakeholders) in maximizing the enterprise's value. If so, that body should by law (1) be so instructed, and 
furnished with appropriate criteria for decision, and (2) be constituted of appropriately weighted representatives 
of each class of claimants.”
Note the similarity between Brudney’s requirement (1) and Berle’s requirement for “a system of 
community obligations” that is framed “with clarity and force.” 
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see why directors should become [creditors’] fiduciaries, and it is impossible to see how 
directors can at one time be fiduciaries for both (or all) constituencies.”208 209
The conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors is only a specific case that 
exemplifies the multiple constituency problem. In fact, the constituencies of shareholders and 
creditors have more in common with one another than most other constituencies since both of 
them provide capital to the firm. As a result, the relationships between these constituencies 
are less likely to invoke more general political controversies. The foregoing discussion 
therefore provides a good example for the general problem.
208 Id., at 645 n. 128.
209
 The situation may change materially when the firm is no longer “in the vicinity of insolvency” but is 
actually insolvent, even if formal bankruptcy proceedings were not initiated. At that point, creditors legally are 
the residual claimholders such that fiduciary duties should run to them. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976 (4th Cir. 1982); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-90 
(Del. Ch. 1992) (acknowledging fiduciary duties to creditors); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco 
Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors when a 
transaction leaves the corporation insolvent or with unreasonably small capital); Odyssey Partners v. Fleming 
Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 420 (Del. Ch. 1999) (the board of an insolvent corporation was under a duty to balance the 
effect of corporate action on “shareholders, creditors and other corporate constituencies”).
Note, however, that even insolvent corporations, who are in bankruptcy proceedings, may face the 
problem of multiple constituencies. There, the amalgam of constituencies that constitutes the corporate 
enterprise under Credit Lyonnais is replaced with a similar amalgam, which is the estate. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank 
v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292 (D. Del. 2000) (officers and directors of an insolvent corporation have a 
"fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the estate as a whole, including its creditors, equity interest holders 
and other parties in interest"). For an analysis, see Lynn M. Lopucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Reply 
to Baird and  Rasmussen's 'The End of Bankruptcy’, 56 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that no 
single class of residual owners  exists in most bankrupt firms); Jesse M. Fried & Alon Chaver, Managers’ 
Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1813 
(2002) (arguing that an insolvent firm is likely to have two types of creditors such the duty to maximize the 
value of only one category may be inefficient); Jonathan Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Volition, 
Cognition, Exit and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing 
that fiduciary duties of distressed corporations should shift only toward relatively weaker creditors, who lack 
volition, cognition, and exit). For additional analyses of the relationships between shareholders and creditors as 
corporate constituencies, see Ann E. Conway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate 
Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1995); Laura Lin, 
Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 1485 (1993); Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the 
Financially Troubled Company, 48 BUS. LAW. 239 (1992); Zipora Cohen, Directors' Negligence Liability to 
Creditors: A Comparative and Critical View, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 351 (2001).
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Similar problems can be found between shareholders and other constituencies.210
Employees in particular have been said to suffer from setting shareholder value as the unique 
corporate governance maximand. Many (though not all) employees make considerable 
investment in firm-specific human capital—namely, skills and knowledge that cannot easily 
be utilized if the worker moved to a different employer or were left without a job. Workers 
may not be fully compensated for this investment through their salaries or wages before some 
unforeseen contingency materializes that threatens their employment.211 In other words, 
employees are exposed to the power of corporate decision makers and, in consequence, to the 
power of shareholders. 
3. The Progressive View
As noted above, American legislators and courts, primarily in the context of other 
constituency statutes,212 have opened the door for considering the interest of employees by 
corporate decision makers. Yet they have provided no guidance as to how such consideration 
could be implemented. Similarly, legal scholars have called for recognizing fiduciary duties 
to corporate employees especially during financial distress.213 Many of these calls are part of 
210 Cf. Fried & Chaver, supra note 209, at 1817 n. 9 (“We assume that the only parties affected by 
managers' decisions upon a firm's insolvency are those holding financial and performance claims against the 
firm. To the extent that other parties - such as potential tort victims - are affected by managers' decisions, our 
approach would need to be modified to require managers to account for the interests of these other parties.”)
211
 This view thus contrasts with the view of Easterbrook and Fischel and their followers, that 
employees are similar to other creditors in that they can assess the likelihood of their employer’s failure (either 
directly or by relying on market prices) and can negotiate for a compensation for this expected loss.
212 See supra text to note 174 et seq.
213 See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a 
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991) (arguing that directors should owe 
employees a fiduciary duty to alleviate employee displacement caused by corporate restructuring); Katherine 
Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON 
L. REV. 45 (1991) (advocating the creation of fiduciary duties on behalf of employees); see also Kent 
Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1998); Joseph William Singer, Jobs 
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the Progressive Corporate Law movement whose members advocate using and, to the extent 
necessary, also reforming corporate law in order to promote the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies: employees, local communities, the environment.214
The Progressive Corporate Law movement is ideologically associated with the 
communitarian movement headed by Amitai Etzioni and can roughly be characterized as of 
left-of-center persuasion.215 The communitarian view argues for the ability to choose 
different rules for different situations in corporate law216 and for discharging fiduciary duties 
toward various constituencies on a case-by- case, situation-specific basis.217 That this would 
create uncertainty is readily admitted by these scholars and is actually seen as an 
advantage.218 The progressive left-wing political characterization of this group contrasts 
advocates of multiple-constituency corporate governance with some prominent advocates of 
adhering to shareholder value as a unique maximand, who self-label as political
and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 475 (1993); Alan Hyde, Ownership, 
Contract, and Politics in the Protection of Employees against Risk, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 721 (1993).
214
 For general background, see PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); see
also Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992); Ronald 
M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1409 (1993); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate 
Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990); Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate 
Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215 (1992); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 
(1991); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity 
and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565 (1993). For a recent symposium see
Symposium, Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890 (2002) 
(discussing LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT (2001)).
215 See, e.g., Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram, and James P. Walsh, The 
Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a 
Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9 41-44 (1999). See, generally, AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF 
COMMUNITY: THE REINVENTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: 
TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988). 
216
 Orts, supra note 214, at 1581.
217
 O’Connor, supra note 213, at 1259.
218 Id., id.
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conservatives.219 To the latter, as we have seen, the need to address multiple interests under 
uncertainty renders multiple-constituency corporate governance unworkable.220
4. Hierarchical Models
The journey through the intellectual history of the stockholder-stakeholder debate in 
the United States would not be complete without noting two interesting recent contributions. 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have offered a new view on the role of directors in public 
corporations.221 Blair and Stout propose to adopt a view of the corporation as a team to which 
different constituencies—shareholder, creditors, employees, managers, and communities—
contribute and from which they expect certain returns. Because contracting among 
constituencies cannot be complete constituencies constantly have competing claims and each 
constituency may be exposed to the opportunistic power of other constituencies.222 The 
public corporation, it is argued, is better viewed as a “mediating hierarchy” in which the 
directors are the “mediating hierarchs.” The board enjoys ultimate decisionmaking authority 
219 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of 
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997).
220 See Stephen Mark Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate, VILLANOVA J. 
L. INVESTMENT MGMT. (forthcoming 2003) (hereinafter The Bishops), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=308604 (arguing that requiring directors to make trade-offs 
between shareholder and stakeholder interests would prove unworkable).
221
 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA L. REV.
247 (1999) (hereinafter Team Production); Lynn A. Stout & Margaret M. Blair, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1737 (2001) (hereinafter Behavioral 
Foundations); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of 
the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403 (2001) (hereinafter Director Accountability); Lynn A. Stout, Bad 
and Not-So- Bad Arguments For Shareholder Primacy, 75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, On the 
Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your 
Board) (Working paper 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=389407.
222 Id., at 276-87.
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to determine the use of corporate assets and to reconcile all the conflicting interests and 
disputes that may arise among corporate constituencies.223
Like any other theory of corporate governance, the mediating hierarch model needs to 
address two different questions: first, what prevents such powerful hierarchs from using their 
power to their own personal benefit, and second, how should these hierarchs exercise their 
power to reconcile conflicts of interest among constituencies. Blair and Stout propose an 
answer to the first question but eschew the second question altogether. 
In regards with the problem of curbing managerial opportunism (which is largely 
beside the focus of this study) Blair and Stout marshal a large body of behavioral research 
that has looked at people’s behavior in social dilemma games. In such games subjects have to 
weigh their self-interest, usually expressed in some monetary payoff, against the interest of 
other players. It is now well established that in seeming contradiction to predictions of neo-
classical economic theory, subjects quite often behave in ways that appear altruistic: They 
would sacrifice self-reward to achieve an outcome that benefits others, or in ways that appear 
compatible with an abstract ethical principle (e.g., fairness).224 225
223 Id., at 276-77. Blair and Stout’s team production model draws on Armen A. Alchian & Harold 
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); their 
mediating hierarch view is influenced by Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in the Theory of a Firm, 
113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998). Blair & Stout, id., at 265, 271.
224
 As noted in the text, this is the subject of a huge literature. Blair and Stout review some of this 
literature and apply its major findings to their mediating hierarch model in Blair & Stout, Behavioral 
Foundations, supra note 221. For a review see, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social Preferences 
Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, 112 ECON. J. C1 
(2002); see also Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187 (1988); David 
Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 
7 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 58 (1995).
225
 Blair and Stout also argue generally, that managers derive utility from keeping their job in which 
they serve their corporate constituents well and that corporate law limits managers’ ability to enrich themselves 
at the expense of other corporate constituents. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 221, at 315. Whether 
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Compelling as it may be, the evidence from behavioral economics is unhelpful in 
resolving the problem of multiple constituencies’ interests. This body of evidence may be 
relevant primarily to situations that involve conflict of interest between managers and the 
corporation or beneficiaries of the corporation. In other words, this evidence may shed light 
on the type of agency problem, which is relatively less controversial. To the extent that the 
experimental results carry over to real-life situations, they may mitigate concerns about 
managerial opportunism. With regard to the conflict of interest among constituencies, Blair 
and Stout’s approach suggests that directors should not be under direct control of either 
shareholders or other stakeholders, although they believe that shareholders would benefit 
from granting directors discretion to favor other constituencies.226
Stephen Bainbridge has advanced a “director primacy” theory that shares major 
features with Blair and Stout’s mediating hierarch model.227 Drawing on early work by 
Kenneth Arrow on governance in institutions, Bainbridge argues that authority rather than 
consensus should be the governance mechanism in corporations and that the directors are the 
these factors are sufficient for preventing managerial opportunism in extreme settings like a hostile takeover bid 
is controversial. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 973, 1023 n.133 (2002) (questioning the validity of Blair and Stout’s argument in the takeover context). 
For a general critique of the mediating hierarch model, see Meese, supra note 193.
226
 Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 221, at 255, 304; Blair and Stout, Director 
Accountability, supra note 221, at 424. Blair and Stout therefore distance themselves from progressive 
commentators who have argued that corporate law ought to be reformed to make directors more accountable to 
stakeholders. Team Production, id., at 255.
227
 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (hereinafter Means and Ends); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate 
Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002) (hereinafter: Preliminary Reflections); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002) (hereinafter:
Nexus of Contracts); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 45 (2002). On the similarity between Bainbridge’s model and Blair and Stout’s model, see
Bainbridge, Preliminary Reflections, id., at 795 n. 21 (“As a positive description of corporate governance, 
director primacy bears some resemblance to Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout's team production model, especially 
in that both models assume that control over the corporation and its "assets is exercised by an internal hierarchy, 
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proper locus of authority.228 The board of directors is portrayed not as an agent for the 
shareholders but rather as “a sort of Platonic guardian serving as the nexus of the various 
contracts that make up the corporation.”229 Unlike Blair and Stout, Bainbridge holds to the 
view that shareholder value should be the sole maximand of corporate governance.230 Similar 
to the claim in traditional economic analysis, the fear is that requiring directors to make trade-
offs between shareholder and stakeholder interests would prove unworkable.231
F. A New Look at the Old Debate
The standard reading of the stockholder-stakeholder debate used to be couched in 
terms of desirability—that is, whether corporate fiduciaries should be accountable to non-
shareholder constituencies. As we have seen, modern economic theory teaches that simple 
economic analysis cannot resolve this question. This Part has shown that below the surface of 
the question of desirability there lies a more fundamental problem of feasibility – whether 
corporate fiduciaries can, systematically, be held accountable to multiple non-shareholder 
constituencies. Berle was the first to identify this problem as the factor that should determine 
legal policy. Berle strongly believed that accountability to multiple constituencies is desirable 
“at the apex of which sits"a board of directors whose authority over the use of corporate assets is virtually 
absolute.”) (citing Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 221, at 251).
228
 Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, id., at 20 (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF 
ORGANIZATION 69-70 (1974)).
229
 Bainbridge, Preliminary Reflections, supra note 227, at 795.
230
 Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra note 227, at 549 (“[D]irector primacy claims that shareholders 
are the appropriate beneficiaries of director fiduciary duties. Hence, director accountability for maximizing 
shareholder wealth remains an important component of director primacy.”) This view has been advanced by 
Bainbridge well before he put forward the director primacy model. See Bainbridge, supra note 193, at 1446 
(“How would I feel about living in a world governed by the moral rules implicit in the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm? Frankly, my answer is: ‘pretty good.’... That rule has helped produce an economy that is 
dominated by public corporations, which in turn has produced the highest standard of living of any society in the 
history of the world.”)
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but could not think of a way to implement it. He therefore advocated accountability only to 
shareholders as a distant second best in order to at least mitigate the adverse effects of 
insiders’ self-interest.
Modern economic theory vindicates Berle’s position. This theory also highlights the 
gravity of the implementation problem in formalizing the notion that the corporation is not a 
nexus of contracts but rather a nexus of power relationships governed only partially by the 
law. The interests of various corporate constituencies are inherently indeterminate and, 
consequently, may be inherently conflicting. The recent contributions by Blair and Stout and 
by Bainbridge continue the old divide between stakeholderists and stockholderists. These 
authors explicate the fact that corporate decision makers have both the duty and power to 
reconcile conflicting interests on a constant basis. Notwithstanding the similarity of their 
basic frameworks, these authors, like many before them, disagree on whether American 
managers can be trusted to successfully deal with situations that involve multiple 
considerations, ambiguity and uncertainty.
The theory of values and cognitive style put forward in Part II casts the stockholder-
stakeholder debate in a new light that exposes its roots. The polar views in this debate reflect 
different assumptions about the psychology of American mangers and the American culture. 
The position that shareholder value should be the only maximand of corporate governance 
reflects a belief that, on average, American managers would find it difficult to function under 
a multiple constituency accountability regime and are likely to take advantage of the situation 
231
 Bainbridge, The Bishops, supra note 220, at 6. Bainbridge does not elaborate on the problem of 
unworkability although this position is compatible with tradition economic analyses that reject recognizing 
multiple maximands for this reason.
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to benefit themselves. Proponents of multiple constituency accountability appear to believe 
that the personal qualities of the average American manager enable her to manage complex 
situations to the benefit of all corporate constituencies even without a clear roadmap.
The present theory allows one to move from general assertions of the sort just made to 
a more rigorous framework that allows for empirical testing. Thus, the debate should be 
analyzed as a controversy over the values and need for cognitive closure of American 
managers and other decision makers. The single shareholder-value-maximand position is 
consistent with the view that managers emphasize values of Conservation and Self-
enhancement more than values of Openness to change and Self-transcendence. In accordance 
with the emphasis on Conservation, the single maximand position also implies that managers’ 
average level of need for cognitive closure may be too high to enable them simultaneously to 
consider the interests of multiple constituencies and cope with the confusion they entail. The 
opposite holds for the multiple maximands position: Emphasis on Openness to change and 
Self-transcendence and low need for cognitive closure that accommodates handling multiple 
considerations under uncertainty on an ad hoc basis.
As we have seen, Tetlock’s study of American managers provides evidence in support 
of this analysis.232 Tetlock uses political positions to conceptualize and operationalize values 
at the individual level. In this analysis, political conservatism and libertarianism are 
contrasted with liberalism in supporting a single versus multiple maximands corporate 
governance, respectively. The Schwartz model of individual values offers a superior 
232
 Tetlock, supra note 44.
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analytical framework for discussing value-related issues, especially in comparative contexts, 
and should yield equivalent results.
The value dimension framework also allows for identifying gaps in existing 
theoretical accounts. In the main, most theorists have focused on managerial self-interest. 
This aspect is related primarily to the Self-enhancement/Self-transcendence dimension. Little 
elaboration if any has been offered in regards to the reconciliation of conflicting interests of 
third parties by managers. Scholars either assume that this task is feasible or that it is not, 
without elaborating on factors that may affect managers’ ability to cope with this 
implementation problem. By relating this aspect to the Openness to change/Conservation 
dimension, this paper points to the direction in which further research should continue.233
The foregoing analysis leads to an interesting conclusion about the future of the 
stockholder-stakeholder debate. It also provides an important lesson for policy makers. In 
brief, this debate is unlikely ever to be resolved. People’s positions in this debate appear to be 
rooted deep in their individual value preferences and cognitive style. The American society, 
like every other society, has a wide distribution of individual traits, including value 
preferences and cognitive styles. The insight that multiple considerations and ambiguity are 
inherent to managing corporate affairs entails that people will always differ on how best to 
cope with this task.
233
 Even the more sophisticated accounts, such as Blair and Stout’s theory of the board a mediating 
hierarch, fail to account for the latter aspect in postulating the mechanisms that affect directors’ behavior. Blair 
and Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 221, point to evidence on other-regarding behavior by (largely 
Western) subjects. Unfortunately, this evidence has not yet been connected to psychological theories of values, 
but its underlying theme suggests a relation mostly with the Self-enhancement/Self-transcendence dimension 
identified by Schwartz. As far as I am aware, behavioral economics thus far has neglected factors that relate to 
the Openness to change/Conservation dimension and to the need for cognitive closure. As this paper argues, the 
latter two factors may play a significant role in determining the maximands of corporate governance.
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Do these insights imply the desirability of legal reform in the United States 
(specifically, a reform in the direction advocated by stakeholderists)? It appears not. Since the 
board of directors is the ultimate holder and arbiter of power in the corporation, the question 
essentially boils down to the one debated by Berle and Dodd, to wit, “To whom are corporate 
directors trustees?” Once the American jurisprudence had defined the relations between 
corporate officers and corporate constituencies (and the corporation itself) as relations that 
rest on power differences, an accountability-based legal regime was the natural response 
given the legal roots of American corporate law in common law and equity principles. Such a 
regime precludes loyalty to multiple beneficiaries almost by definition, irrespective of the 
danger of managerial opportunism. A legal reform that required directors to discharge their 
fiduciary duties simultaneously to multiple constituencies thus would resemble trying to fit a 
square peg into a round hole. It would not matter, for that purpose, whether one classified 
such multiple-beneficiary duties in the duty of loyalty or the duty of care rubrics.
By uncovering the psychological roots of the stockholder-stakeholder debate, this 
article implies that legal reform—no matter how well intentioned it may be—is unlikely to 
eradicate the consequences of the balance struck by American legislators and courts, that 
focuses primarily on shareholders’ interests. The current legal environment apparently is one 
in which more managers can function given their level of need for cognitive closure. A legal 
regime that imposes a lower cognitive load allows a wider range of managers to discharge 
their duties effectively, as it accommodates those managers who are higher on the need for 
closure. Managers with a lower need for closure can still function under a single-maximand 
regime. Yet by not equally catering to the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, the 
current regime may be leading to sub-optimal management of firms, as several management 
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scholars argue.234 What may look to some as unnecessary social loss, however, may actually 
be a social optimum once the constraint of cognitive style is taken into account.
If the present hypotheses are correct—namely, that a higher level of need for 
cognitive closure is accompanied by individual emphases on certain values (Conservation 
and Self-enhancement)—then the current U.S. legal regime also reflects a political balance. 
Hence, the political overtones of the stockholder-stakeholder debate are simply 
manifestations of its underlying psychological foundations. No amount of economic analysis 
is likely to be decisive in the eyes of people who disagree on what’s important in life. 
Tetlock’s study demonstrates that these differences cut across many issues unrelated to 
corporate governance. As for corporate governance, Berle has identified the second-best 
solution. Subsequent developments in the American society apparently have not yet changed 
its values to an extent that would cause it to reject the shareholder-primacy norm.
Finally, two general points deserve noting about conclusions that the present analysis 
does not entail. First, the present theory improves our understanding of the mechanisms that 
underlie the choice of maximands for corporate governance. This analysis does not imply, 
however, that one version of corporate governance is universally better than the other. The 
fact that some managers (or people in general) have a strong need for cognitive closure, that 
they prefer security and conformity more than self-direction, etc., does not mean that they 
would be worse managers. Indeed, the contrary may be true. These managers may also be 
more decisive, better able to see through the details, and so on. In the same vein, higher 
234
 For a development of this theme, see below Part III.
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Openness to change and lower need for cognitive closure may lead to procrastination – a bad 
quality for managers.235
Second, it may be a mistake to attribute the value preferences and cognitive style 
associated with either the stockholder or the stakeholder view to proponents of these views. 
Thus, it would be wrong to assume that advocates of the single shareholder-value-maximand 
position are all right-wing conservatives with low tolerance for ambiguity and nuance whose 
early childhood development was somehow impaired.236  When the discussion revolves on 
law- and policy-making, the crucial consideration is which policy would better fit the general, 
average case. One can be of strong liberal persuasion and bent on dialectical reasoning yet 
hold the view that American corporations had better be managed under a single-maximand 
accountability regime. Adolf Berle is a shining example of the ability to draw the line 
between one’s own values and optimal policy-making.
IV. MANAGEMENT THEORIES
Lawyers are not alone in addressing the maximands of corporate governance. 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a similar debate among management scholars has developed and 
has been running on nearly parallel tracks to the legal discourse. Both strands of theoretical 
analysis, however, feature their own versions of the monist, single-constituency shareholder 
paradigm versus the pluralist, multiple-constituency stakeholder paradigm. However, 
management scholars have made considerable progress with regard to the implementation 
problem of reconciling multiple conflicting interests. These theories have gone virtually 
235
 Tetlock, supra note 44, provides an excellent discussion of the relativity of these qualities.
236 See supra note 42.
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unnoticed among legal commentators237 although it bears important implications for legal 
analysis. This Part aims to partially remedy this deficiency. Sections A through C review 
current theories and Section D assesses them against the theory of values and cognitive style.
A. Stakeholder Theory
Edward Freeman’s landmark book Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach
marks the inception of the stakeholder-stockholder debate in management studies.238 This 
book was written with a view to helping American managers cope with vast changes that had 
taken place in their business environment, in particular the increase in the external demands 
placed on the corporation in a turbulent period.239 “External change produces uncertainty,” 
wrote Freeman, “It makes us uncomfortable because it cannot be readily assimilated into the 
relatively more comfortable relationship with suppliers, owners, customers and 
employees.”240 The stakeholder management approach advanced by Freeman thus was 
designed to help managers reduce uncertainty and discomfort.241 At the center of this theory 
stands the concept of stakeholders, defined as follows.
A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.242
237
 Management scholars writing in the legal literature are aware of this body of knowledge, of course. 
See, e.g., Orts, supra note 167 (Orts is affiliated with the legal studies department at the Wharton School of 
Business); Dunfee, supra note 181; Bradley et al., supra note 215.
238 R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).
239 Id., at v, 3- 5.
240 Id., at 12-13.
241 Id., id.
242 Id., at 46. This definition of stakeholder draws on earlier definitions in the management literature 
that grew out of management practice. According to Freeman, id., it first appeared in 1963 in a memorandum at 
the Stanford Research Institute (now SRI International, Inc.) as “those groups without whose support the 
organization would cease to exist.” The list of stakeholders originally included shareholders, employees, 
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This definition implies that to the traditional list of stakeholders managers needed to
add governments, competitors, consumer advocates, environmentalists, special interest 
groups, and the media.243 The crucial feature in this definition of stakeholders—and one that 
has engendered heated controversies—is the fact that it is free of legitimacy considerations. 
In fact, a stakeholder could be anyone – even a terrorist group. Freeman agnostically noted 
that if a terrorist group could affect the corporation then managers couldn’t ignore it.244 One 
needs only to consider discount airlines after September 11, 2001 to see the point.245
The original value-free, practice-oriented version of stakeholder management theory 
soon gave rise to several branches of analysis that derived different theses from it.246 One 
way to understand stakeholder theory is as a descriptive thesis, presenting models that 
describe what the corporation is. Second, stakeholder theory is also an instrumental one, 
namely, dealing with practical prescriptions for corporations’ survival and success in 
business. The more contentious interpretations of stakeholder theory, however, are the 
customers, suppliers, lenders and society.  SRI’s work was heavily influenced by concepts that were developed 
in the planning department of Lockheed and further developed in IGOR ANSOFF, CORPORATE STRATEGY (1965). 
However, Freeman traces the history of the stakeholder concept before SRI to Adam Smith and Berle and 
Means. See FREEMAN, id., at 32; R. Edward Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic 
Management, in HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 189, 189 (M. Hitt, E. Freeman, & J. Harrison, eds. 
2001).
243 FREEMAN, supra note 238, at 11-22.
244 Id., at 45, 53. (“[The] broad notion of  “stakeholders” will include a number of groups who may not 
be “legitimate” in the sense that they will have vastly different values and agendas for action from our own. 
Some groups may have as an objective simply to interfere with the smooth operation of our business. For 
instance, some corporations must count “terrorist groups” as stakeholders…. Strategies must be put in place to 
deal with terrorists if the can substantially affect the operations of the business.”) 
245
 Nevertheless, opponents of stakeholder theories cite the reference to terrorist groups with an 
unmistakable innuendo. See Elaine Sternberg, The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, 5(1) CORP. GOVERNANCE: 
INT’L REV. 3, 4 (1997) (“Terrorists and competitors, vegetation and nameless sea creatures, and generations yet 
unborn are amongst the many groups which are now seriously considered to be business stakeholders.”) 
(footnotes omitted); Jensen, supra note 1, at 9n1 (same).
246 See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory for the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 66-67 (1995).
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normative and managerial theses. As a normative thesis, the theory’s focus is on the 
legitimacy of claims on the corporation from various groups and individuals. In this view, the 
theory implies that “each group of stakeholders merits consideration for its own sake and not 
merely because of its ability to further the interests of some other group, such as 
shareowners.”247 Finally, stakeholder theory can also be seen as implying a managerial thesis 
in the sense of prescribing structures and practices for managing stakeholder affairs.248
The normative interpretation of stakeholder theory therefore rejects the idea of a 
single maximand for corporate governance on ethical grounds. Although Freeman originally 
did not develop this facet of his stakeholder management theory, the fields of business ethics 
and business and society have embraced stakeholder theory and extensively rely on it. These 
analyses infuse (or augment) the basic framework with value-based arguments that draw 
heavily on notions of individual autonomy and fairness toward all societal members.249
Adoption and implementation of stakeholder management as a normative thesis require that 
managers also subscribe to certain values and to “value-based-management.” Managers need 
247 Id., at 67.
248 Id., id.
249
 For a sample of ethical analyses of stakeholder theory, see, e.g., Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business 
Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 53 (1991); William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A 
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(Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 4th ed. 1993); John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the 
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445 (1994); Thomas Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics, 20 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 92 (1995); Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory and a Principle of Fairness, 7 BUS. ETHICS Q. 51 
(1997); Thomas M. Jones & Andrew C. Wicks, Convergent Stakeholder Theory. 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 206 
(1999); Robert Phillips & Joel E. Reichart, The Environment as a Stakeholder: A Fairness-Based Approach, 23 
J. BUS. ETHICS 185 (2000).
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to share a core set of values and incorporate these values as a key element of the strategic 
management process.250
An important outcome of grounding stakeholder theory in normative propositions that 
draw on values and ethics is that the theory immediately becomes political.251 This outcome 
can hardly go unnoticed. However, one may find it difficult readily to classify the theory 
along a left-right dimension. Freeman himself has provided different political interpretations 
of stakeholder theory, ranging from liberal to libertarian interpretations.252 The liberal 
element of stakeholder theory is based on the notions of autonomy, solidarity, and fairness as 
articulated by John Rawls253 and others. This element entails pursuit of basic equality among 
stakeholders in terms of their moral rights as these are realized in the firm.254 The libertarian 
element of this theory is reflected in the theory’s reliance on a contractual model, which in 
turn connotes values of liberty of will and personal freedom.255 It is worth noting that both 
positions emphasize promotion of individual autonomy; they differ on the question of the 
appropriate relations between the autonomous person and the larger society. Liberalism more 
250
 Freeman & McVea, supra note 242.
251
 As a normative thesis, stakeholder theory also becomes relevant for legal matters. Given that this 
theory champions consideration of multiple stakeholders, it is not surprising that Dodd’s work is cited as a 
matter of practice. See, e.g., Donaldson & Preston, supra note 246, at 65. As noted above, however, a lot 
remains to be done on the interface between corporate law and management theories.
252
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connote different political view in different countries. See supra note 44.
253 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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 R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
409, 415 (1994).
255 See Freeman, id., at 415; R. Edward Freeman & Robert A. Phillips, Stakeholder Theory: A 
Libertarian Defense (Darden Business School Working Paper No. 01-03 2003) available at 
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than libertarianism calls on individual persons to consider other social members and 
voluntarily promote their interests.
Ethical and philosophical considerations aside, stakeholder theory, as a managerial 
thesis, puts the emphasis on the need to pay simultaneous attention to the interests of all 
appropriate stakeholders.256 This aspect points to two separate challenges that must be met: 
First, identifying all appropriate stakeholders, and second, managing these stakeholders. With 
regard to the first challenge, the question “Who is a stakeholder?” has received numerous 
answers over the years. While some scholars used narrow definitions that focused on the 
legitimacy of stakeholders’ claims (determined on a legal or moral basis), others preferred a 
broader definition (in line with Freeman’s original view) that emphasized the stakeholder’s 
power to influence the firm’s affairs, whether or not these are legitimate claims.257
In addition, stakeholder management also has to deal with the problem of balancing 
stakeholders’ conflicting interests beyond the general prescription of conducting a case-by-
case analysis. What makes this a challenge is the fact that the theory “rejects the very idea of 
maximizing a single objective function… Rather, stakeholder management is a never-ending 
task of balancing and integrating multiple relations and multiple objectives.”258 Almost by 
necessity, stakeholder theory faces severe implementation problems resembling those that 
have encumbered multiple-constituency theories in corporate law for decades. 
B. The Critique
256
 Donaldson & Preston, supra note 246, at 67.
257 See Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley Agle, & Donna J. Wood, Toward a Theory of Stakeholder 
Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
853, 862 (1997). These authors, in 1997, counted no less than 27 definitions for stakeholders. Id., at 858 tbl. 1.
258
 Freeman & McVea, supra note 242.
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It should come as little surprise that stakeholder theory is not without opposition 
among management scholars. The most prominent opponents probably are Elaine Sternberg, 
a British commentator, and Michael Jensen, among the founding fathers of modern corporate 
governance theory. Sternberg tends to emphasize the ethical aspects, arguing that stakeholder 
theory cannot be justified. In brief, it is argued that the fact that some groups may have power 
over the corporation does not give those groups legitimate authority over it, or the right to 
hold it to account. Stakeholder theory, so runs the argument, is both “deeply dangerous and 
wholly unjustified” because it “undermines private property, denies agents’ duties to 
principals, and destroys wealth.”259
Jensen too employs strong language to criticize stakeholder theory, focusing primarily 
on the problem of multiple maximands.
“What is commonly known as stakeholder theory, while not totally without content, is 
fundamentally flawed because it violates the proposition that any organization must have a 
single valued objective as a precursor to purposeful or rational behaviour… It is logically 
impossible to maximise in more than one dimension at the same time… Telling a manager to 
maximize [several objectives] leaves the managers with no objective. The result will be 
confusion and lack of purpose that will fundamentally handicap the firm in its competition for 
survival.”260
Jensen’s reasoning weaves together several arguments. First, there is an economic 
theory argument, under which maximizing the firm’s financial value, defined as the sum of 
259 See Sternberg, supra note 245, at 6-9; see also ELAINE STERNBERG, THE STAKEHOLDER CONCEPT: A 
MISTAKEN DOCTRINE (1999). 
260
 Jensen, supra note 1, at 300-301.
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equity and other financial claims on the firm, is efficient.261 Second, there is a governance 
argument, according to which mangers that owe duties to several stakeholders are 
accountable to none and are bound to prefer their own self-interest.262 Third, Jensen makes a 
political objection, because, as a basis for action, stakeholder theory politicizes the 
corporation.263 Finally, and most important, Jensen makes a psychological argument. 
Stakeholder theory is deficient under this argument because it confuses managers, and 
confusion is bound to handicap the firm.264
Now these arguments all ring familiar, of course, as they replicate claims made by 
lawyers since the inception of the Berle-Dodd dialogue. The novelty in Jensen’s position in 
my mind lies not in the economic analysis (which is old, as Jensen indeed emphasizes) but 
rather in the stress he puts on the psychological drawbacks of stakeholder theory. Moreover, 
inspired by Friedrich Hayek’s work on the modern market economy,265 Jensen seems to hold 
261 Id., at 301-04. For a similar analysis, see Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate 
Objective Revisited, ORGANIZATION SC. (forthcoming 2003).
262 Id., at 305 (“Because stakeholder theory provides no definition of better, it leaves manages and 
directors unaccountable for their stewardship of the firm’s resources… Stakeholder theory plays into the hands 
of self-interested managers allowing them to pursue their own self-interest.”)
263 Id., at 300.
264 Id., at 301. For similar reasons, Jensen, id., at 310 et seq., also criticizes a management theory called 
“The Balanced Scorecard.” This theory was designed to improve current performance measurement systems by 
providing alternatives to managing organizational performance exclusively through financial measures. The 
Balanced Scorecard tracks key elements of an organization’s strategy by allowing the organization to view its 
performance through multiple lenses. See ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, THE BALANCED 
SCORECARD: TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO ACTION (1996); see also ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, 
THE STRATEGY-FOCUSED ORGANIZATION: HOW BALANCED SCORECARD COMPANIES THRIVE IN THE NEW 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT (2000). According to Jensen, “[t]he Balanced Scorecard is the managerial equivalent 
of stakeholder theory. Like stakeholder theory, the notion of a ‘balanced’ scorecard appeals to many, but it is 
similarly flawed…Just as in the case of multiple constituencies,… a decision maker cannot make rational 
choices without some overall single dimensional objective to be maximized. Given a dozen or two dozen 
measures and no sense of the tradeoffs between them, the typical manager will be unable to behave 
purposefully, and the result will be confusion.” (italics added).
265 Id., at 306-07 (citing Friedrich A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. 
HAYEK 14 (W.W. Bartley, ed. 1988)).
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that financial value maximization is sharp and modern while stakeholder management is not 
only confusing but outright primeval: 
“Stakeholder theory taps into the deep emotional commitment of most individuals to 
the family and tribe. For tens of thousands of years those of our ancestors who had little 
respect for of loyalty to the family, band, or tribe probably did not survive… Many People are 
drawn to stakeholder theory through their evolutionary attachment to the small group and 
family.”266
Notwithstanding the sharp differences between stakeholder theorists and their 
opponents over the question “What are the right maximands?” both sides resemble in being 
unable to provide satisfactory solutions for addressing non-shareholder constituencies. Even a 
manager who is a staunch believer in shareholder value maximization somehow must deal 
with workers, local politicians, NGOs, and so forth. To this end, Jensen advances what he 
calls the “enlightened stakeholder theory.” This approach builds on stakeholder theory in 
terms of designing ways for the firm to manage its relations with all-important constituencies 
and adds to it the injunction that the maximand of the firms is its long-term market value. 
This objective function, Jensen surmises, “gives managers a way to assess the tradeoffs that 
must be made among competing constituencies.”267 Exactly how managers should assess this 
tradeoff when long-term market value may call for sacrificing shareholder value remains 
unspecified, however. Managers are left to their own devices.268
C. Toward a Dynamic Stakeholder Theory
266 Id., id.
267
 Jensen, supra note 1, at 309-310.
268 Id, at 308 (likening this task to telling players to score goals in football or soccer without telling 
them how to win the game.)
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Like legal commentators, management scholars of all persuasions share the view that 
corporate fiduciaries face multiple conflicting claims and interests, which they have to 
identify and deal with on a constant basis. In contrast with legal commentators, however, 
management researchers have made some progress toward addressing this challenge. 
Mitchell, Agle, and Wood advance a model of stakeholder salience that covers both 
stakeholder identification and stakeholder management. Mitchell et al. argue that the 
stakeholder framework cannot readily explain the complex considerations that are involved in 
giving priorities to competing stakeholder claims.269
Mitchell et al. claim that beyond identifying stakeholders using the standard test of 
ability to affect and being affected, a managerial theory also needs to consider stakeholder 
salience, namely, the factor that can explain to whom and to what managers pay attention. 
Mitchell et al. propose that classes of stakeholders can be identified by three attributes: (1) 
the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm; (2) the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s 
relationship with the firm; and (3) the urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the firm. These 
three attributes together create different levels of stakeholder salience, which point out to 
managers whom they should pay attention to.270
To define “power,” Mitchell et al. combine a variety of definitions, which, in the end, 
all draw on Max Weber’s coceptualization of “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship would be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance.”271 This is 
269
 Mitchell et al., supra note 257, at 854.
270 Id. , id.
271 Id., at 865 (citing MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947)). 
Other definitions cited by Mitchell et al. are essentially identical.
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essentially the definition advanced by Hohfeld earlier in the twentieth century.272 Weber’s 
definition is broader in scope in that it also encompasses coercive uses of power, while 
Hohfeld was interested only in legal relations. This notion of “power” is also central in the 
concept of governance generally and corporate governance in particular.273
The attribute of legitimacy in Mitchell et al.’s theory loosely refers to socially 
accepted or expected structures of behavior. The authors adopt a definition of legitimacy that 
integrates several approaches that together refer to a generalized perception or assumption
about what is desirable, proper, or appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions.274 Mitchell et al.’s definition of legitimacy is nearly identical 
to definition of “social norms” and “culture” in social psychology and other social sciences. I 
return to this aspect below. At this point suffice is to say that once a theory of stakeholder 
identification is based on social norms and cultural values, it immediately ceases to be 
universal and becomes contextual—that is, it depends on characteristics that may (and do) 
vary across societies and time.275
Finally, the attribute of urgency reflects the degree to which stakeholders’ claim call 
for immediate attention. It combines a dimension of time sensitivity (how pressing is the 
claim in that delays in addressing it would be damaging) and criticality (how important it is to 
the stakeholder).
272 See supra note 199.
273 See Licht, supra note 88.
274
 Mitchell et al., supra note 257, at 866 (citing Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic 
and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. (1995)).
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The significant contribution of the stakeholder salience model lies in the distinction it 
makes between stakeholders that deserve to be addressed (under any view of corporate 
governance) and stakeholders whose claim actually gets to be addressed. Sometimes, a claim 
that deserves attention gets neglected while managers invest resources in addressing a claim 
that should have been ignored. The pivotal factor here is the managers. “It is the firm’s 
managers who determine which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive managerial 
attention,” aver Mitchell et al. 276 Managers’ personal characteristics thus play a role as 
moderators between stakeholders’ attributes in the abstract and corporate action. Managers, 
however, vary greatly in their personal capabilities and values. A theory of stakeholder 
management therefore must account for individual qualities of decision makers.
Empirical support for Mitchell et al.’s theory was provided by a study conducted by 
Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld.277 These researchers further elaborate the mediating factor of 
managers’ characteristics and argue that they are likely to be connected to managers’ 
individual values of self-interest versus other-regarding interest. They also assert that 
managerial perception is critical to the salience of stakeholders and that values are critical to 
perception.278 Agle et al. surveyed 70 CEOs out of 650 corporations in the Standard and 
275
 Mitchell et al, supra note 257, at 866-67, note that this definition is representative of sociologically 
based definition of legitimacy and that analyzing legitimacy should be done at multiple levels, the most common 
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276 Id., at 871.
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Poor’s 500 list and 150 other large U.S. corporations.279 CEOs were asked to evaluate the 
aforementioned attributes (power, legitimacy, urgency) for each of Freeman’s generic 
stakeholder groups (shareholders, employees, customers, government bodies, and 
community/charitable groups). The results provided strong support to the hypothesis that the 
stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency are indeed related to stakeholder 
salience. With regard to the moderating role of managers’ values, however, the overall 
pattern of results was one of nonsignificance.280 Agle et al. also failed to find evidence for a 
relationship between stakeholder salience and corporate performance and for a relationship 
between CEO values and corporate performance.281
D. Assessment
The present theory of values and cognitive style lends itself to assessing the major 
positions in management studies and to generalizing Mitchell et al.’s theory. When one 
279
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280
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considers Freeman’s stakeholder management theory and Jensen’s critique in light of the 
present framework one can readily see how both are grounded in value preferences and the 
need for cognitive closure. Freeman’s original theory is universal in that it does not hinge on 
a particular profile of value preferences and cognitive style. Nor is this theory tailored to 
societal values prevailing in the United States or in particular other countries.282 Stakeholder 
theory is value-free but not value-neutral, however. Management in line with this theory is 
bound to differ in accordance with particular managers’ individual characteristics and with 
the cultural orientations of the country in which they operate. This framework, therefore, can 
accommodate political positions but does not imply specific political persuasions.
In contrast, Jensen’s position reflects a view of managers as having only a specific set 
of personal traits. Jensen portrays managers as individuals with strong preference for values 
of security, tradition, and conformity (Conservation), and power, achievement, and hedonism 
(Self-enhancement) and exceedingly high need for cognitive closure. By exaggeration, 
Jensen’s repeating claim, that multiple stakeholders would confuse managers beyond control, 
might sound as if managers cannot walk and chew gum at the same time. This position can be 
justified only if one believed that this is a good portrait of the average American manager – a 
belief that may depend on one’s own values and cognitive style.
One may further object to Jensen’s depiction of the emotions and values of 
stakeholder theory supporters as vestiges of primeval times. This aspect is best understood 
Clarkson, A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance, 20 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 92 (1995).
282
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against a theoretical backdrop of societal-level value dimensions. There is no denying that 
communitarian commentators indeed support the multiple constituency version of corporate 
governance.283 There is nonetheless a significant difference between stakeholder management 
and ancient communal preferences. Depending on the context, a widely-followed injunction 
to consider others may express cultural orientations of Embeddedness or Egalitarianism that 
prevail in many advanced economies, although not in the United States.284 Stated otherwise, 
stakeholderism can be as modern as shareholder primacy is.
Mitchell et al.’s stakeholder identification and salience model makes a significant 
progress in the theory of corporate stakeholders by turning it from a static theory into a 
dynamic one. According to this theory, two factors affect “who gets what” in the business 
corporation: (1) the values of the society in which the corporation operates, and (2) the 
personal characteristics of those who control the corporation, be they executive managers or 
controlling shareholders. Thus, the theory encompasses both the societal as well as the 
individual levels of analysis – a quality that virtually all the analyses in the legal literature 
seem to lack. In addition, Mitchell et al.’s theory implies that at the individual level, several 
factors may operate, including managers’ own personal values and their different levels of 
urgency, or time pressures. It therefore comes close to identifying managers’ cognitive style 
as potentially significant factor in the working of stakeholder management. Time pressure 
and urgency increase the need for cognitive closure. Managers with higher levels of such 
need may thus invest personal and corporate resources to deal with more pressing 
283 See supra text to note 215.
284 See below text to note 305 et seq.
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constituencies. They would tend to prefer a simple, single-maximand accountability regime 
to one that features multiple maximands.285
Finally the present theory points to a possible reason for Agle et al.’s failure to find 
supportive evidence in respect with a moderating role of managers’ values in determining 
stakeholder salience. In order to capture managers’ values, Agle at al. used a limited set of 
value items, which they culled from Rokeach’s value inventory.286 These items all reflect 
values that belong to the Self-enhancement/Self-transcendence dimension.287 Agle et al. 
failed to consider the Openness to change/Conservation dimension, which seems highly 
relevant for managing multiple stakeholders and is related to the need for cognitive 
closure.288 The value dimension framework thus makes it possible to identify such omissions 
and to point out directions for future research.
V. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The debate over the maximands of corporate governance is no longer limited to the 
United States. While the American corporate governance system adheres to shareholder 
primacy, its German and Japanese counterparts feature strong protections for employees, 
creditors, and other non-shareholder constituencies in general. These protections rest on a 
combination of legal rules, structural arrangements, and informal social norms, sometimes 
loosely referred to as culture. As it happens, the specific cases of the United States, Germany, 
285
 The notion of salience, however, may encompass additional factors that bear on perception and 
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286 See supra text to note 16 et seq.
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and Japan represent wider groupings of corporate governance regimes. This Part 
demonstrates the usefulness of the value dimension framework the analysis of comparative 
issues. Section A begins with a comparative review of corporate governance groupings. This 
is followed by an overview of the convergence dynamics in what regards stockholders versus 
stakeholders in Section B.
A. Major Groupings of Corporate Governance
Systems of corporate governance similar to that of the United States exist in other 
English-speaking countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.289 These 
countries share a legal system that is based on English common law and equity principles (the 
latter being especially influential in matters of corporate law due to historical reasons). 
Shareholder primacy is the predominant norm in these countries.290 Subject to the legal 
doctrine of separate corporate personality, shareholders are assumed to be the indirect owners 
of the corporation and only they have voting rights on nominating the board of directors.291
Public companies in the U.S. and U.K. in particular tend to be internationally unique in that 
288
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they have a widely dispersed shareholder body.292 Finally, The United Kingdom has its own 
version of a Dodge-like precedent.293 This decision was followed by a legislative amendment 
somewhat akin to American other-constituency statutes.294
In Western Europe, German corporate governance is a prime example of a 
stakeholder-oriented system.295 German corporate law directs managers’ fiduciary duties to a 
diverse group of multiple constituencies, including shareholder, employees, and society as a 
292 See La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 313. The historical reasons that supported the 
emergence of dispersed shareholding in the U.S. and the U.K. may be different in each country. See MARK J. 
ROE, Strong MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS – THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); 
Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter?: The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 459 (2002).
293
 Parke v Daily News Ltd. [1962] Ch 927.  In this case, a newspaper publishing company suffered 
substantial trading losses on its newspapers to the point where it would have dissipated all its assets. The board 
had decided to sell all the company’s assets and to distribute the balance of the purchase money by giving 
compensation to the company’s employees and pensioners beyond their legal and contractual entitlements in 
order “to alleviate the suffering and hardship which may occur.” Citing the famous adage that “[t]he law does 
not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for 
the benefit of the company.” (Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co. (1883) 23 Ch.D. 654, 673, C.A.), the Parke
court held that the intended payments cannot go forward and that the proceeds of the sale should be distributed 
to shareholders. 
294
 Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 was enacted in 1980 (then as part of section 46 of the 
Companies Act 1980) to respond to the Parke decision. This section states that directors are authorized take into 
account the interests of employees when performing their functions for the company. This duty is to be regarded 
as a fiduciary duty owed to the company. In addition, section 719 to the Companies Act enables a company to 
provide for its employees if the company's business is wound up. However, under section 309, only the 
company (possibly through its shareholders) can challenge the decisions of the directors and employees do not 
have standing to do so. The legal situation is identical with regard to section 719. Consequently, and in parallel 
with U.S. other-constituency statutes, section 309 does not provide employees with substantial protection. See L. 
S. Sealy, Directors' “Wider” Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural 13 MON. U. L. 
REV. 164, 177 (1987) (arguing that section 309 “is either one of the most incompetent or one of the most cynical 
pieces of drafting on record.”) 
295
 The following text draws on Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection 
Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany (Working paper 2003); Mark G. Robilotti, 
Recent Development: Codetermination, Stakeholder Rights, and Hostile Takeovers: A Reevaluation of the 
Evidence from Abroad, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 536 (1997). On German corporate governance, see, generally, Hwa-
Jin Kim, Markets, Financial Institutions, and Corporate Governance: Perspectives from Germany, 26 LAW & 
POL. INT’L BUS. 371 (1995); Thomas J. Andre, Jr. Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon 
Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69 (1998). See also Mark J. Roe, Some 
Differences In Corporate Structure In Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993); 
FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (2000); but see Michael H. Bradley & 
Anant K. Sundaram, The Emergence of Shareholder Value in the German Corporation (working paper 2003) 
(arguing that large German corporations have become shareholder-oriented).
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whole.296 The hallmark of the German system, however, is its codetermination regime, which 
provides employees with structural protection through representation in corporate institutions. 
Under German codetermination, firms have a two-tiered board structure. Companies are 
governed by a managing board (Vorstand) that conducts the day-to-day business of the firm 
and a supervisory council (Aufsichtsrat) that elects and monitors the firm’s management and 
approves major corporate decisions. The German Codetermination Act of 1976 mandates that 
fifty percent of the Aufsichtsrat of large firms be elected by shareholders and fifty percent by 
employees, or by their delegates if the firm is very large. 
Employee participation in the supervisory organ is also mandated (with qualifications) 
in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden.297 In France, 
Ireland, Portugal, and other EU Member States, the law includes aspects of employee 
participation in corporate governance.298 It should be emphasized that membership in the 
296
 Gérard Hertig & Joseph A. McCahery,  Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided 
Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition? (ECGI Working Paper 2003) (citing H. Hirte, Verteidigung 
gegen Ubernahmeangebote und Rechtsschutz des Aktioners gegen die Verteidigung, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR 
UNTERNEHMENS UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, 623, 643 (2002)). Other commentators are like-minded. See
Bradley et al., supra note 215, at 52 (“Corporate law in Germany makes it abundantly clear that shareholders are 
only one of the many stakeholders on whose behalf the managers must operate the firm.”); Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 
Cornell L. Rev. 1133, 1157 (1999) (“German law takes more seriously the idea that beneficiaries of directors' 
duties include corporate constituents other than shareholders ... .”); Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, 
Corporate Governance in a Global Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 846 (2000) (“German corporate law clearly shows that managers must operate the firm for 
the benefit of multiple stakeholders, not just shareholders.”); Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate 
Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT'L REV. 
L. & ECON. 203, 208 (1994) (“Maximization of shareholders’ wealth has hardly ever been the objective of 
German stock corporations.”).
297
 Luca Enriques, Silence Is Golden: The European Company Statute as a Catalyst for Company Law 
Arbitrage (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 07/2003 2003) (citing Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Comparative 
Study Of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union And Its Member States, Final Report & 
Annexes I-III, at 44 (2002)). See also 
298 See Uwe Blaurock, Steps Toward a Uniform Corporate Law in the European Union, 31 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 377, 390 (1998); see also Antoine Rebérioux, Europena Style Corporate Governance at the 
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supervisory board does not give employees formal decision power. Nonetheless, the 
structural involvement of non-shareholder constituencies in firms’ governance is effective in 
mitigating informational asymmetries and facilitates informal negotiations among corporate 
constituencies.
Asian corporate governance systems are perhaps the least comprehensible to the 
Western observer. For instance, both the Japanese and Korean models of corporate 
governance rest on a statutory infrastructure that consists of a German-inspired civil and 
commercial codes and an American-inspired corporate law. Both countries nonetheless have 
developed corporate governance systems that differ markedly from the German and 
American models, from one another,299 and from other Asian countries.300 Subject to these 
reservations, corporate governance in Japanese and Korean corporations tends to rely more 
extensively on interpersonal relationships. In Korea, these relationships are often based on 
extended family (clan) kinship. Corporate groups are the predominant form of business 
Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement, 40 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 111 (2002); Karel Lannoo, A 
European Perspective on Corporate Governance, 37 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 269 (1999).
299
 For recent discussion of  Japan, see, e.g., Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examinging Legal 
Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law (Columbia Law and Economics Working 
Paper No. 219 2003); Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of Corporate 
Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189 (2000); Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Dangerous and Harmful, Though Maybe Not Irrelevant, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1227 (1999); Hideki Kanda, 
Japan, in THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 111 (Arthur R. 
Pinto & Gustavo Visentini eds., 1998). On Korea, see, e.g., Kon Sik Kim & Joongi Kim, Revamping Fiduciary 
Duties in Korea: Does Law Matter in Corporate Governance?, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS (Curtis J. Milhaupt, ed. 2003); 
Hwa-Jin Kim, Toward the “Best Practice” Model in a Globalizing Market: Recent Developments in Korean 
Corporate Governance, in 5 YEARBOOK LAW AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN EAST ASIA 1 (2002); Bernard S. Black, 
Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness, 26 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 537 (2001); Jill Frances Solomon, Aris Solomna, & Chang-Young Park, A Conceptual Framework for 
Corporate Governance Reform in South Korea, 10 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 29 (2002).
300 See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of 'Global' Convergence in Corporate 
Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321 (2001) (discussing Indonesia); Benny Simon Tabalujan, Family 
Capitalism and Corporate Governance of Family-controlled Listed Companies in Indonesia, 25 U. NSW L.J. 
(2002) (same).
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organization. Both the Japanese keiretsu and the Korean chaebol exhibit extensive cross-
holdings among corporations that engage in a variety of industrial and financial activities.301
These Asian systems are generally perceived as stakeholder-oriented.302 Commentators 
routinely make references to Asian cultures (especially to Confucianism with regard to Korea 
and Japan) as the bedrock of corporate governance practices.303
The preceding sketchy portraits of corporate governance systems in English-speaking, 
West European, and East Asian countries correspond with the cultural profiles of these 
regions under Schwartz’s cultural-level model. Let us here focus on the English-speaking 
versus West European regions.304 Although countries in these two groups are usually lumped 
together as “Western,” Schwartz and Ros find that West European nations and English-
speaking nations constitute culturally different regions that cannot simply be characterized as 
“individualistic”.305 In a global comparison, countries in both regions attribute high 
301
 For a critical assessment of Japan, see, Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of the 
Keiretsu, 11 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 169 (2002); on Korea, see, e.g., Daehong T. Jaang, Kyung-soo Kim, 
Woo Tack Kim, & Sangsoo Park, Cross Shareholding and Corporate Financial Policy: the Case of Korea 
(Working Paper 2002).
302 See Shishido, supra note 143, at 201 (“many will agree that Japanese corporate practice is 
employee-oriented rather than pro-shareholder”); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor 
Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 538 (1999) (same); 
Solomon et al., supra note 299, at 30-31 (same, with regard to Korea).
303 See, e.g., Meredith Woo-Cumings, Diverse Paths toward “the Right Institutions:” Law, the State, 
and Economic Reform in East Asia (ADB Institute Working Paper 18, 2001); Janis Sarra, Corporate 
Governance in Global Capital Markets: Canadian and International Developments, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1691, 
1728-29 (2002); Branson, supra note 300, at 344-45.
304
 In the Schwartz data, Korea’s scores reflect societal preferences for Embeddedness over Autonomy, 
for Hierarchy over Egalitarianism, and for Mastery over Harmony. This profile is consonant with many analyses 
of Confucian culture. For a cultural value dimension analysis of Korean corporate governance see Licht, supra
note 94. Japan presents an exception to profile of its cultural region. Several samples from Japan reveal strong 
cultural emphases on orientation that oppose one another. This finding suggests that Japanese culture has 
evolved in a manner different from most other and/or that is in a period of transition. Sagiv & Schwartz, supra
note 100, at n.6.
305 See Shalom H. Schwartz & Maria Ros, Values in the West: A Theoretical and Empirical Challenge 
to the Individualism-Collectivism Cultural Dimension, 1 WORLD PSYCHOL. 93, 111 (1995).
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importance to the two Autonomy orientations, with West European countries scoring 
particularly high on Intellectual Autonomy. These regions part ways, however, in their 
locations on the other two dimensions. West European countries attribute greater importance 
to Egalitarianism and Harmony while English-speaking countries (especially American 
samples) attribute greater importance to Hierarchy and Mastery.
As suggested by the theoretical analysis in Part II, the cultural differences between the 
United States and Western Europe are consistent with the different positions among these 
countries in regards with the maximands of corporate governance. West European countries 
emphasize the more complex orientations in the two dimensions that concern interrelations in 
and with the social and natural world. In contrast, the cultural profile of the United States 
emphasizes less complex orientations that promote power and control while championing the 
autonomy of the individual person. One can therefore expect that both regions will develop 
accountability regimes, but that the European accountability will feature multiple 
constituencies as accountees while the American accountability will seek to define power 
hierarchies among constituencies. This is indeed the case.
In addition to promoting shareholder wealth maximization, the combination of 
Autonomy and Hierarchy also may lead to greater tolerance toward hostile takeovers—a 
hallmark of American and English corporate governance.306 Such tolerance reflects 
acceptance of pursuit of wealth and power for the benefit of a single constituency or even few 
individuals. This may be the case even if ensuing layoffs could be more disruptive in 
comparison to layoffs in egalitarian societies that maintain better social safety nets. 
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Doubtless, tolerance toward the more hostile takeovers also conveys a societal taste for 
Mastery, a value type that connotes exploitation. This and other typically American norms307
share an attitude of legitimation – ranging from deference to respect to admiration – of 
individuals who take advantage of their wealth and/or power. 
Among the socio-historical variables that might help to explain the unique value 
profiles of Western Europe and the United States, Schwartz and Ros note that “[i]n Western 
Europe more than in the United States, socialist governments that pursue the politics of the 
welfare state emerged… [whereas in] the United States, perhaps due to impacts of the frontier 
experience and of large corporations on societal developments, welfare socialism did not take 
root.”308 This conjecture links culture and politics and supports Mark Roe’s political theory of 
comparative corporate governance.309 According to Roe, the predominance of social 
democracy in Western Europe explains the rejection of the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm in countries like France, Germany, Italy, and in Scandinavia. The failure of social 
306 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1287-90 
(1999) (discussing the emergence of a hostile takeover norm in the United States). 
307
 Other characteristic norms of American corporate governance include high levels of executive 
compensation and deference to managerial discretion, as reflected in the (legal) norm of business judgment rule. 
See, respectively, Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 -30 (2000); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Islands of 
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001).
308 Id., id., at 114.
309 See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000) (hereinafter Political Preconditions); see also MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL 
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003). This work extends Roe’s groundbreaking work on the 
political roots of American corporate governance. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate 
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 32-37 (1991); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE 
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
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democracy to take root in the United State therefore enabled the rise of widely dispersed 
shareholding and the adherence to shareholder wealth maximization.310
B. Seeming Convergence Trends
Major economic and geo-political processes have joined together during the 1990s to 
broaden the scope of the stockholder-stakeholder debate such that today it spans the entire 
globe. At the turn of the previous decade, the American economy was still struggling in the 
wake of the turbulent downsizing period of the 1980s and was in fact heading toward a 
recession. In contrast, the Japanese and German economies were then at the apex of an 
unprecedented growth period. But then things changed. Japan declined into a deep recession 
from which it has not recovered to this day. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc from 1989 to the 
early 1990s created an urgent need for establishing market economies in former soviet 
countries. The unification of Germany, which was part of this process, burdened the German 
economy, while the United States began to grow briskly and re-assumed economic 
leadership, particularly in hi-tech industries. To complete the picture, a series of financial 
crises swept Latin America in the mid-1990s and in the late 1990s, another wave of financial 
crises crippled Asian economies, including several “tiger economies” that were considered 
poster children of economic growth, such as South Korea. 
These events first engendered interest in non-American corporate governance systems 
with a view to adopting successful features of foreign corporate governance in the United 
310
 Roe, Political Preconditions, id., at 543 (“Social democracies do not strongly control public firm 
agency costs because they do not want unbridled shareholder-wealth maximization, and, hence, by weakening 
shareholder-wealth maximization institutions, they widen the gap between managers and dispersed stockholders. 
When the gap is wide enough, the large American-style public firm is rendered unstable.”)
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States. Comparative corporate governance was born as an academic field of interest.311 At 
first, mostly lawyers were writing on these issues but in the mid-1990s economists too started 
to show interest in comparative corporate governance.312 Corporate governance has drawn 
tremendous attention in light of a growing consensus that an effective corporate governance 
system may be a crucial precondition for a thriving market economy. By that time, however, 
the German and Japanese corporate governance models have lost favor and the Anglo-
American model came to be seen as superior.313 Germany, along with other European 
economies, began to embrace the Anglo-American “equity culture” that gives primacy to 
shareholder value at the expense of other constituencies.314 Motivated by the evidence that 
corporate governance matters for economic performance, international bodies began to 
endorse corporate governance reform that draws on American features as a standard 
311 See Edward B. Rock, America's Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 367 (1996) (“In the last few years, comparative corporate governance — German and 
Japanese corporate governance in particular — has been a hot topic in U.S. law reviews and conferences.”)  
(footnote omitted). The omitted footnote includes an extensive list of law review articles in this spirit, which is 
nevertheless far from exhaustive.
312
 The pioneering works were produced by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny. See
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al, 
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). These studies prompted a flurry of studies that are too 
numerous to cite here. For a recent review, see Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, & Ailsa Roell, Corporate 
Governance and Control (ECGI working paper no. 2/2002 2002).
313
 Beyond the obvious success of the American economy in the second half of the 1990s, this 
perception was to a large extent due to the work of La Porta et al., id., which demonstrated strong associations 
between economic performance and a common law origin of countries’ legal systems, and vice versa for civil 
law origin. See also Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership 
around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (hereinafter Corporate Ownership); Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 22 
(2000). La Porta et al. thus concluded that “[i]n general, differences among legal origins are best described by 
the proposition that some countries protect all investors better than others, and not by the proposition that some 
countries protect shareholders while other countries protect creditors.” Rafael La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 8 (2000). 
314 See Andre, supra note 296; Roger W. Mills & Bill Weinstein, Beyond Shareholder Value -
Reconciling the Shareholder and Stakeholder Perspectives, 25 J. GENERAL MGMT. 79 (2000). 
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prescription for transition economies. International aid for distressed economies is 
conditioned on implementing such reforms. Again, Korea is a prominent example.315
The shifts of attention, and favor, from American to non-American corporate 
governance and back again to the American model were accompanied by parallel shifts with 
regard to stockholder vs. stakeholder interest as the desirable maximands of corporate 
governance. During the 1990s, corporate governance analysis entered a new phase when 
study groups in the public and private sector alike began to promulgate codes of principles 
for optimal corporate governance. The turning point was the 1992 Cadbury Report, 
commissioned by the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the 
accountancy profession.316 It marked a conceptual change with regard to corporate 
governance reform as it called for “soft regulation”—namely, the use non-binding rules and 
practices—and underscored the importance of private, market-driven improvements in 
corporate governance.
The Cadbury Report was followed by similar initiatives in many countries in 
Europe317 and in other parts of the world, including Asia and Latin America.318 The large 
majority of these documents have been promulgated since 1999, however. To understand the 
315
 Hwa-Jin Kim, Toward the “Best Practice” Model in a Globalizing Market: Recent Developments in 
Korean Corporate Governance, in 2 J. CORP. L. STUD. (2002). On the alleged role of corporate governance in 
the Korean crisis, see Tomas J.T. Balino & Angel Ubide, The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997: A Strategy for 
Financial Sector Reform (IMF Working Paper WP/99/29 1999); Magdi Iskander et al., Corporate Restructuring 
and Governance in East Asia, 36(1) FIN. & DEVELOPMENT (1999), available at 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/iskander.htm>.
316 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1992) 
(“Cadbury Report”) available at http://www.ecgi.de/codes/country_documents/uk/cadbury.pdf.
317
 The list includes, by order of promulgation, France, The Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Finland, Germany, Denmark, and Austria. The texts of the respective documents are all available at 
http://www.ecgi.de/codes/all_codes.htm.
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popularity of these “codes of best principles” one should be aware of two major factors that 
provided strong incentives for countries and firms to follow this route. The first factor was 
indeed market-driven. During the 1990s, institutional investors in the U.S. and the U.K. grew 
in terms of the size of their managed funds and particularly the share of their portfolios 
earmarked for foreign securities. Some of the largest institutional investors have adopted an 
“active” investment policy that focused on corporate governance in their portfolio companies 
and sought to improve it.319 These investors also drafted documents on optimal corporate 
governance that dovetailed the Cadbury Report and its progeny. These two policies combined 
together well to exert pressure on foreign corporations to adopt legal and structural measures 
that would bring them in line with the recommended “optimum.” Investor associations 
jumped the bandwagon and contributed their own documents.320 Building on these 
developments, a new industry of corporate governance rating services has emerged, which 
measures compliance with these principles as part of corporate governance consulting.321
318
 In Asia: Japan and Korea. In Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, and Peru.
319
 For a review and critical analysis of institutional investor activism, see Bernard S. Black, 
Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). On CalPERS's interest in foreign corporate 
governance as an extension of its interest in corporate governance in general, see, e.g., Claire Crutchley et al., 
The Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS' Activism, 7 FIN. SERV. REV. 1 (1998).
320
 The European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) keeps track of corporate governance codes 
around the world. As of August 2003, the ECGI had recorded 118 such documents, promulgated by 38 countries 
and four multinational organizations. A comprehensive list of these documents and their text can be found at 
http://www.ecgi.de/codes/all_codes.htm.
321
 The new rating agencies derive from the codes of best principles (or from similar documents) lists 
of features that companies should have in their articles of association, the structure of the board and its 
committees, and so forth. These ratings may create economic incentives for firms to adopt these features and 
thus render corporate governance reform genuinely market-driven. For a review and empirical analysis of 
corporate governance rating based on data from Crdit Lyonnais Securities Asia, see Krishna Palepu, Tarun 
Khanna, & Joseph Kogan, Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance: A Cross-Country  Analysis 
(Harvard University Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 02-041 2002).
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The picture would not be complete without considering the second factor, to wit, the 
Principles of Corporate Governance adopted by the OECD Ministers in 1999.322 These non-
binding principles are intended to serve as a reference point for countries’ efforts to evaluate 
and improve their own legal, institutional and regulatory framework. Shortly thereafter, the 
OECD and the World Bank signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The signatory parties 
agreed to adopt the OECD Principles as the point of reference in their corporate governance 
reform initiatives in transition economies and developing countries.323 The parties also 
established the Global Corporate Governance Forum with a similar mission statement.324
Moreover, CalPERS and other institutional investors adopted the Principles as guiding 
principles for their corporate governance agenda for foreign portfolio companies.325 These 
developments obviously have given the OECD Principles clout far exceeding their seeming 
non-binding character. The Principles now constitute a benchmark for the myriad codes 
around the world, which in 2003 numbered well over a hundred.326
322 AD HOC TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, DOCUMENT SG/CG (99) 5, 2 (1999) [hereinafter OECD PRINCIPLES].  The Principles came in the 
wake of earlier activities. In 1996, the OECD set up a Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate 
Governance to review and analyse international corporate governance issues and to suggest priorities for the 
work of the OECD in this area.  The Advisory Group reported in April 1998, and suggested “that the OECD 
recommended minimum standards of corporate governance to promote fairness, transparency, accountability, 
and responsibility.  Rejecting a "one-size-fits-all" approach to corporate governance, [it] advocate[d] the need 
for pluralism and adaptability in corporate governance.” See Licht, supra note 19, at 150  (describing adoption 
of OECD PRINCIPLES).
323 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OECD AND THE WORLD BANK  (1999), available 
at http://www.gcgf.org/aboutus/munderstanding.htm.
324 See GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM , CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ISSUE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN (2003) available at http://www.gcgf.org/about.htm#initiative; see also THE WORLD 
BANK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION (2001), available at 
www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/privatesector/cg/docs/gcgfbooklet.pdf.
325
 Licht, supra note 19, at 153-57.
326 See supra note 320.
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The upshot of the code of principles movement is that, either thanks to moral suasion 
or due to pressure from markets and financial institutions, similar codes of principles are 
peddled globally today as reflecting optimal corporate governance. These codes cover a 
variety of issues but their dominant focus is on boards and board-related issues,327 with a 
clear view to improving protection of public shareholders from managers and controlling 
shareholders alike. This is both understandable and warranted if the concerns of institutional 
investors are to be addressed such that they would be willing to invest in foreign equities. It is 
debatable, however, how much of an impact this (apparent) budding consensus might have on 
the issue of stockholder vs. stakeholder interests.328
The OECD Principles consider corporate stakeholders rather vaguely and half-
heartedly. The Principles state at the outset that “[e]mployees and other stakeholders play an 
important role in contributing to the long-term success and performance of the corporation, 
while governments establish the overall institutional and legal framework for corporate 
governance.”329 When it comes to implementation, however, the Principles adopt a complete 
deference approach as they call for recognizing the rights of stakeholders but limit the latter 
only to rights established by law. When law protects such rights, the Principles call for 
327
 Becht et al., supra note 312, at 67.
328
 More generally, one may doubt whether genuine progress toward convergence to a global optimum 
in shareholder protection could be achieved through the code movement or other standardized legal reforms. For 
critical discussions, see Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97 (2002); Janis Sarra, Convergence Versus Divergence, Global Corporate Governance at 
the Crossroads: Governance Norms, Capital Markets & OECD Principles for Corporate Governance, 33 
OTTAWA L. REV. 177 (2001/2002). The skeptical tone of these articles stands in contrast with the high spirit that 
is commonly found in contemporary discussions of corporate social responsibility. See, e.g., Holly J. Gregory & 
Jane G. Pollack, Corporate Responsibility, GLOBAL COUNSEL, March 2002, at 41, available at 
www.practiallaw.com/global (surveying codes). The latter discussions often fail to distinguish between 
declarations in codes and actual corporate or national reality – a mistake that is identical to reading the other
constituency statutes in the United States as attesting to a paradigm shift toward favoring stakeholders in this 
country.
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respecting them, albeit weakly, primarily through effective disclosure (transparency).330 The 
difficult job of reconciling conflicting interests of various stakeholders is relegated to the 
board of directors.331 It should be obvious at this point that in discharging this duty, directors 
will be affected by their different values and cognitive styles.
Notwithstanding the OECD Principles, a comparative study of corporate governance
codes relevant to the European Union commissioned by the European Commission finds 
differences in the legal status of stakeholders across Europe, in line with the above review. 
The traditional differences between English and continental European corporate governance 
in what regards non-shareholder constituencies remain intact notwithstanding calls in the 
U.K. for assessing risks and opportunities for these constituencies.332 This study too points to 
329 OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 322, at 3.
330
 Principle III of the OECD PRINCIPLES, id., at 7, reads as follows.
“III. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders as established by law 
and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises.
A. The corporate governance framework should assure that the rights of stakeholders that are protected 
by law are respected.
B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to obtain 
effective redress for violation of their rights.
C. The corporate governance framework should permit performance-enhancing mechanisms for 
stakeholder participation.
D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to 
relevant information.”
331 See Nestor Stilpon, INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHY AND 
HOW (2001) (“The Principles make it clear that it is the duty of the board to act fairly with respect to all groups 
of shareholders and with stakeholders, and to assure compliance with applicable laws.”) (Stilpon was Head of 
Corporate Affairs Division at the OECD).
332 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INTERNAL MARKET DIRECTORATE GENERAL, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES RELEVANT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES 34-37 
(2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-
rpt_en.htm.
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national culture as underlying these differences.333 Moreover, in the wake of the Enron-
WorldCom wave of scandal, the pendulum seems to be shifting back as European fascination 
with American corporate governance has abated considerably. The European Union recently 
adopted a policy to promote corporate social responsibility (CSR), defined as “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”334
A sober analysis of the code of principles movement therefore leads to the conclusion 
that it has so far had a negligible effect on the stockholder-stakeholder issue. To paraphrase a 
critique on the English supposedly pro-employee legislation, the stakeholder-related 
provisions in the OECD Principles and the codes that follow them may be considered either 
cynical or incompetent.335 In contrast with the issue of shareholder protection, on which 
codes adopt strong normative positions intended to improve it, the codes either preserve 
different national positions, or, in the case of international codes, fully defer to such 
positions. Moreover, virtually no progress can be related to the code movement with regard to 
resolving the implementation problem that has bedeviled proponents of other constituency 
interests since the time of Berle and Dodd. In light of the cultural orientations to which these 
issues are linked, this is not entirely surprising.
VI. CONCLUSION
333 Id., at 29.
334
 Several EU bodies are involved in promoting CSR, including the Commission, the Employment and 
Social Affairs Council, and the Parliament. For a concentration of related documents, see
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_index.htm.
335 See Sealy, supra note 294.
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This article has sought to broaden our understanding the raison d’être of corporations 
as it is reflected in the maximands of corporate governance. The debate over the appropriate 
maximand has been raging for decades and is still taking place as vigorously as ever. 
Advances in economic theory have not only failed to resolve this debate, but have established 
that the problem is graver than what many may have estimated. Notwithstanding this 
theoretical impasse, corporate managers and recently also policy makers around the world 
face the maximands problem regularly.
This paper has put forward a new theory about the factors that determine these 
maximands. Drawing on recent advances in psychological research, this theory points to 
value emphases at the individual and societal levels and to the need for cognitive closure as 
such factors. This theory further proposes the notion of complexity of values as an organizing 
element that may associate certain value emphases with cognitive style. The present theory 
aims to extend rather than replace economic analyses of the maximands issue. Overall, the 
present theory is able to provide explanations for various features of the stockholder-
stakeholder debate in the United States and in international settings, to identify gaps in other 
theoretical accounts, and to generate testable hypotheses for empirical research. Extant 
evidence largely supports this theory.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. The Schwartz Individual-level Value Types and Values that Represent Them
Self-Direction Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring 
(creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals)
Stimulation Excitement, novelty and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an 
exciting life)
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying 
life)
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according to 
social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential)
Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and 
resources (social power, authority, wealth)
Security Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of 
self (family security, national security, social order, clean, 
reciprocation of favors)
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or 
harm others and violate social expectations or norms (self-
discipline, obedient, politeness, honoring parents and elders)
Tradition Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that 
traditional culture or religion provide (accepting my portion in life, 
humble, devout, respect for tradition, moderate)
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people whom one 
is in frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, 
responsible)
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature (broadminded, wisdom, social 
justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with 
nature, protecting the environment)
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Table 2. The Schwartz Cultural-Level Value Dimensions
Embeddedness/Autonomy This dimension concerns the desirable relationship between the 
individual and the group. Embeddedness represents a cultural 
emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and 
restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidary 
group or the traditional order. The opposite pole describes 
cultures in which the person is viewed as an autonomous, 
bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her own uniqueness.
Hierarchy/Egalitarianism This dimension refers to guaranteeing responsible behavior that 
will preserve the social fabric. Hierarchy represents a cultural 
emphasis on obeying role obligations within a legitimately 
unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources. 
Egalitarianism represents an emphasis on transcendence of 
selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting 
the welfare of others.
Mastery/Harmony This dimension refers to the relation of humankind to the natural 
and social world. Mastery stands for a cultural emphasis on 
getting ahead through active self-assertion whereas Harmony 
represents an emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the 
environment.
Table 3. The Hofstede Cultural-Level Value Dimensions
Individualism/Collectivism Valuing loosely knit social relations in which individuals are 
expected to care only for themselves and their immediate 
families versus tightly knit relations in which they can expect 
their wider in-group (e.g., extended family, clan) to look after 
them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty;
Power Distance Accepting an unequal distribution of power in institutions as 
legitimate or illegitimate
Uncertainty Avoidance Feeling uncomfortable or comfortable with uncertainty and 
ambiguity and therefore valuing or devaluing beliefs and 
institutions that provide certainty and conformity.
Masculinity/Femininity Valuing achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material 
success versus relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and 
interpersonal harmony.
Long-Term Orientation Having a long-term time orientation; emphasizing Confucian 
work ethics such as thrift and persistence.
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Figure2. The Structure of Relations Among Cultural Orientations
        Embeddedness Harmony
      Egalitarianism
      Hierarchy
Intellectual
Autonomy
      Mastery       Affective
      Autonomy
